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ABSTRACT
Designing Pension Programs to Strengthen Formal Labor Markets in Developing
Countries: The Case of Indonesia

By
Muliadi Widjaja
Date
December 2007
Committee Chair: Dr. James Alm
Major Department: Economics
Despite many studies of the pension systems in developed countries, little work
has been done on how to apply a sustainable pension system in developing countries. The
set-ups of pension systems in developed versus developing countries are expected to be
different because in developing countries much labor is concentrated in informal
production sectors, while labor in developed countries is more fully located in formal
production sectors. Informal production sectors are sectors where the government has few
tools to implement fiscal policies (taxes and subsidies) on firms and labor. This research
develops a comprehensive system on how to set up pension policies generally in
developing countries and specifically in Indonesia.
The basic set-up of the pension system suggested in this dissertation is
multidimensional: a short run consumption tax policy to finance a defined benefit plan to
support minimum physical needs of the older population, a medium run labor income tax

x

policy to finance individuals defined contribution fully funded savings plan, and a long
run skilled labor creation through university education so that individuals are able to selffinance their own pension savings through the fully funded savings plan. The defined
benefit plan is important because it serves as a societal redistribution tool, while the
defined contribution plan serves as a household savings tool. In addition, the skilled labor
creation serves as a supporting tool so that the pension program can be sustained in the
long run.
A theoretical model is developed from Auerbach and Kotlikoff that utilizes an
overlapping generation (OLG) computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, calibrated
for the Indonesian economy by introducing heterogeneity in households including skilled
and unskilled labor. I apply a mathematical programming system for general equilibrium
analysis (MPSGE), developed by Thomas Rutherford. Some parameters used in the
model are estimated by using econometric methods. The OLG-CGE model is applied in
order to analyze the impact of consumption taxes and pension taxes on labor supply and
also to calculate the equivalent variation of the distribution of consumption tax burden
across generations. Meanwhile, the impact of skilled labor creation on economic growth
is calculated by applying linear algebra. The main macroeconomic data are taken from
the Indonesian social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 2000. Labor data are taken
from the Indonesian labor condition 1998-2003.
My main findings in this dissertation are several. For the equivalent variations,
the consumption taxes for USD 1, USD 2, and USD 3 cash transfers per day per person
give more benefit to skilled labor than to unskilled labor. The consumption taxes for
USD 1 cash transfer give incentives to the largest amount of labor, both skilled and
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unskilled labor, to work in the formal sector. The amount of labor after the consumption
taxes for USD 1 cash transfer is higher than the initial condition. Increasing the
consumption taxes for the USD 2 cash transfer decreases the amount of labor in the
formal sector, with the amount of skilled labor decreasing more than unskilled labor. In
addition, increasing the consumption taxes for the USD 3 cash transfer would also
decrease the amount of labor in the formal sector, with the amount of unskilled labor
decreasing more than skilled labor. I also find that the elasticity of government education
expenditures with respect to skilled labor creation is roughly 0.3. This means that, if the
Indonesian central government would like to eliminate the informal sector by 25 percent
within 20 years or an average 1.25 percent annually, they must increase government
education expenditures to 8 percent of total annual government budget. Finally, I show
that the increase of skilled labor would contribute positively to the Indonesian economic
growth, while the consumption taxes and the fully funded pension taxes would likely
reduce the current economic growth but increase the future one.
My theoretical contributions are several. First, given dual formal and informal
labor sectors present in an economy, where the latter is dominant, taxation of
expenditures is preferred to taxation of income because the first may induce labor to work
in the formal sector. Second, given dual formal and informal labor sectors present in an
economy, where the latter is again dominant, there exists an optimal level of consumption
taxes that provides incentives for the highest amount of labor, skilled and unskilled labor,
to work in the formal sector.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Demographic changes take place in every country all over the world. In many
countries, parents tend to have fewer children than those in previous generations, and,
because of good health facilities, older people tend to live longer than those in previous
generations (Gruber and Wise, 2001; Weil, 2006). This situation has led to a decreasing
ratio of working population to elderly population. Such phenomenon is called an “aging
population”, and is featured in Table 1.

Table 1. The Ratio of Work Force to Elderly (age 15-59 to age 60+)
in Select Countries
Countries
Year
Canada

2000
3.8

2025
2.0

2050
1.7

China
French
Germany
India
Indonesia
Italy

6.4
3.0
2.6
7.8
8.1
2.6

3.2
1.9
1.6
5.1
5.0
1.6

1.8
1.6
1.3
2.9
2.6
1.1

Japan
United Kingdom
United States

2.7
2.9
3.9

1.5
1.9
2.3

1.1
1.5
2.0

Source: Widjaja’s calculations from “World population prospects: The 2006 revision population database”.

New economic policies are needed to anticipate these changes, including the
policies in social security provision. For countries that run an unfunded defined benefit
pension system, it is projected that collected funds will not be sufficient to pay the
pensions of the future elderly population. The situation threatens the sustainability of an
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unfunded pay-as-you-go pension system. For developing countries that lack an
established pension system, the increasing elderly population creates a strong demand for
the existence of a pension system (even though some countries still rely on existing
family networks). Among problems faced by countries with weak social security systems
and its institutions are: tax evasion, low participation by self-employed workers, liquidity
problems (e.g., the inability of the system to pay the promised benefit), embezzlement of
the collected funds, and a large public debt.
Tax evasion is especially severe in many developing countries since they often
have a large informal labor market that is hard-to-tax. Further, under the provision of a
pay-as-you-go system, taxpayers of social security system understand that the benefits
they receive are only weakly linked to the taxes paid, and they may evade the payment of
social security taxes by reporting lower incomes than actually earned, since they do not
believe that the taxes will be fully reflected in benefits.
Low participation of self-employed workers is a problem faced not only by
developing countries but also by developed countries. One of the reasons for such low
participation of the self-employed is that in a pay-as-you-go system the self-employed
individual is expected to pay double for himself: once as an employee and again as an
employer. For many self-employed, such double payment is considered a heavy burden
on them.
The liquidity problem is caused by the miscalculation of the government’s system
planner regarding the taxes that will be received by the government versus the benefits
that government will pay. In addition to the social security tax evasion mentioned above,
the miscalculation between taxes paid and benefits received may exacerbate government
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budget deficits. Corruption may contribute to this liquidity problem as well, although this
is more related to the weakness of the government’s budget supervising mechanism. A
large public debt problem is also caused by excessive payments of social security benefits.
Under a failed pay-as-you go system, governments in developing countries like Chile
used public debt to finance the social security benefit.
This dissertation offers an alternative set of policies toward pension reform in
developing countries, where formal and informal production and labor sectors exist. The
system offered consists of three integrated programs: consumption taxes to finance a
defined benefit program, a fully funded pension as a savings program, and the education
of skilled labor as a support program for a sustainable pension program.
The object of research in this dissertation is the Indonesian pension system.
Currently, although some state-owned pension funds and many private pension funds
have been running for more than thirty years in Indonesia, there is currently no integrated
pension system, run either by government or by private institutions. One state-owned
pension fund runs the retirement fund of civil servants, while the private pension funds
run the retirement funds for individual third pillar voluntary pensions. It is clear that
Indonesia does not have solid pension institutions.
The Indonesian economy comprises vast amounts of informality in the goods,
labor, and money markets. Informality in the goods market means that firms may sell
goods without being registered as taxpayers. Charmes (2000) predicted that the size of
the informal goods market in Indonesia is around 25 percent of total GDP in 1997. In the
labor market, informality leads to employees working without contracts. Data from the
Indonesian Central Board of Statistics show that around 65 percent of Indonesian
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unskilled labor works in the informal production sector. Finally in the money market,
informality means that lending institutions may not be registered with the central bank.
Nasution (2004) explained that there are more than 6200 non-bank credit institutions in
Indonesia in 1991, and he assumes that most of those credit institutions are informal.
These informal conditions, especially in the goods market and the labor market,
make it difficult for central and local governments to run fiscal policies. Informality in
the goods market prevents the governments from charging taxes on sales and labor
income. Another implication is that firms that have employed informal labor may have no
incentive to register as a taxpayer. The difficulties of the central government in running
fiscal policy also imply that the central government will have difficulties in setting up a
feasible and sustainable integrated pension system, especially when a pay-as-you-go
system is taken into practice.

The Purpose of Research
There are four purposes of research in this dissertation. The first purpose is to
study an incentive for the aging population in Indonesia to retire with a decent living by
providing cash transfers for the retired population. The term “with a decent living” means
that under the constant prices of year 2005, a retiree in Indonesia may earn a pension
amount between USD 1 to USD 3 per day per person. In term of the net replacement rate
for unskilled labor, a USD 1 cash transfer per day per person equals a 30 to 70 percent
net replacement rate, depending on average wages. Also, as shown in Chapter Four of
this dissertation, many Indonesians are still working after age 60 because they do not
have enough funds to currently save for their pension or they did not save enough when
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they were young. In terms of pension provisions, the first purpose is to provide an
integrated pension system.
The second purpose is to look at the distribution of tax burdens across generations
from the consumption tax for cash transfers by calculating the equivalent variations. The
equivalent variation is defined as the differences of expenditure at the new utility
function but different prices because of taxation. The first two purposes will be
elaborated partially in Chapter Six, and the calibration results are discussed in Chapter
Seven. The calibration results are also presented in detail in Appendix B.
The third purpose is to observe how the creation of skilled labor through
education affects the capability of labor to finance their own pension. An increasing
amount of skilled labor that is able to self-finance their own pension will release the
burden of government’s provision of minimum pension budget. This purpose is
elaborated in Chapter Six.
The final purpose of this dissertation is to look at the economic growth impact of
the pension reform by calculating the economic growth from the increase of the annual
output due to the increase of skilled labor, as discussed in Chapter Eight of this
dissertation.

Terms and Definitions
Several common terms and definitions are explained here to be used for the
present chapter and the future ones. Definitions can be found in Private Pensions: OECD
Classification and Glossary (2005), Rachmatawarta (2004), Edey and Simon (1998), and
Feldstein and Samwick (1997).
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A mandatory pension system is defined as a pension system where the central
government requires individuals to pay a pension tax of a certain rate. A voluntary
pension system is a pension system where an individual designs a personal pension
program through a private pension institution. In terms of the width of participation, a
voluntary pension system does not provide broad latitude compared to the mandatory one.
A defined benefit pension system is a pension system where the central
government or a pension institution determines the benefit amount that individuals will
receive when they retire, given a certain rate of previous pension contribution, without a
clear link between the two. A defined contribution pension system means that the
government or a pension institution determines the contribution amount that individuals
must pay for their own pension, and the benefit received later is usually linked to the
contribution.
A pay-as-you-go pension system is defined as a pension system where the central
government charges a pension tax on the labor income of the current working generation
to pay for the pension benefits of the current retired population. A funded-collective
pension system means that the government charges the pension tax on the labor income
of the current working generation for the payment of their own pension benefit in the
future.
Privatization means that central government hands over the management of an
integrated pension system to a private institution.
In general, prefunding means that the government improves its net assets position.
Prefunding as in Rachmatawarta (2004) is defined as the government payment of pension
benefits for the current retiree, taken from other sources of funds outside the pension
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system, in the transition period of changes of pension system from a defined benefit payas-you-go to a defined contribution funded collective system.
Iintergenerational redistribution is defined as taxes and transfers taking place
across cohorts, while intragenerational redistribution is defined as taxes and transfers
taking place within cohorts. The two types of redistributions take place only when a
mandatory defined benefit pay-as-you-go system applied in a country.
Sustainable means that the program has its ability to endogenously finance itself
and run for a long term, i.e., 50 years.

The Reform on the Social Security System Taken
At present, many countries have already enacted some reforms of their social
security system. These reforms are taken largely in order to save the sustainability of the
program to finance itself. I classify between reform in countries with solid institutional
pension systems and countries with weak institutional pension systems.
For countries with a solid institutional pension system, existing reforms include
(McHale, 1999): reducing benefits (U.S.), changing retirement benefits from increasing
rate benefit to flat rate benefits (U.K.), increasing retirement age (Germany, Italy, Japan,
U.K., U.S.), and changing post-retirement indexation from wage indexation to pricelevel indexation. Meanwhile, for countries with weak institutional pension system,
reforms made include (Feldstein, 1998; James, Edwards, and Wong, 2003): changing the
whole system from a mandatory defined benefit pay-as-you-go system into a mandatory
defined contribution funded-collective system, privatizations, and pre-funding during the
transition period (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico ).
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The Result of Reforms Taken on Social Security System
McHale (1999) calculated gross social security wealth (SSW) for a given benefit
formula at certain individual ages for several industrialized countries, which are also
noted as countries that have a strong institutional social security system. Social security
wealth is defined as the discounted present value of implied future benefits evaluated at a
given point in the worker’s life. One of his findings is that there was a substantial loss for
workers’ SSW in observed country after the reform. Table 2 provides details of SSW
changes and the reasons for these changes.

Table 2. Changes of Workers’ Social Security Wealth in Several
Industrialized Countries
Percentage
Reason for Change
Countries
Year of
change in Social
Reform
took place Security Wealth
Men Women
1993
-8.5
-10.0 Wage indexation to price indexation
French
Germany

1992

-2.1

-2.8

Gross wage indexation to net wage indexation

Italy

1992

-3.4

-11.2

Wage indexation to price indexation

Japan

1994

-2.5

-3.1

Gross wage indexation to net wage indexation

U.S.

1993

-1.7

-1.7

Six months of cost of living adjustment freeze

Source: McHale (1999), reprinted with author’s permission.

In Table 2, the changes of indexation in the fourth column are the changes of
adjustment value of the defined benefit of the pension amount. For example, in price
indexation, the pension benefit is calculated subject to the changes of price level, whereas
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in wage indexation the pension benefit is calculated subject to the changes of wage level.
The cost of living adjustment means that the pension benefit is calculated subject to the
changes of cost of living.

Studies of Social Security Systems in Developed Countries
Much previous research has been done on social security systems around the
world. I review the most recent as well as the most influential work.
Country studies usually focus on the impact of a certain system of social security,
or the impact of a certain reform on a social security system on macroeconomic variables
such as savings, capital accumulation, and economic growth, as well as on
microeconomic issues, such as labor supply, redistribution, and welfare. Broer (2002)
used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the impact of reducing
pay-as-you-go benefits on the Dutch economy. His findings are that the reduction of payas-you-go benefits increases equity through the decrease of pay-as-you-go contributions
and the decrease of implicit lump-sum taxes on the older population. Fehr and Steigum
(2002) try to simulate the application of mixed social security system - the combination
of partial pay-as-you-go system and funded collective system - on the Norwegian
economy, using a closed economy CGE model. Liégeois (2002) used a generational
accounting model to analyze the impact of Belgium social security system on
generational equity, and showed that the increase of the aging population in Belgium
could increase tax rates on wages by 8 percent under a pay-as-you-go system. Cavalletti
and Lubke (2002) use the applied general equilibrium (AGE) model to compare the
impact of the 1992 Amato reform and the 1995 Dini reform on Italian economy. The
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1992 Amato reform basically changed the benefit calculation from price indexation to
wage indexation, while the 1995 Dini reform changed the pay-as-you-go with defined
benefit system into the pay-as-you-go with a notional defined contribution system. Their
findings are several: the reforms should be able to produce a lower ratio of pension
expenditure to GDP, but the simulation results highlight some problems poised by
adverse demographic trends in combination with the pay-as-you-go pension scheme.
The studies on social security systems also focus on many specific economic
aspects. There are studies on distributional aspect, i.e. the impact of a certain social
security system on the intergenerational redistributions and the intragenerational
redistributions. For the US case with a pay-as-you-go system, such studies include ones
by Bennett (1979), Hurd and Shoven (1985), Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puvert, and Shoven
(1987), Feldstein and Samwick (1992), and Liebman (2001). Bennet showed that the rate
of return from pay-as-you-go pension system for family pension taxpayer is higher than
that of single. Hurd and Shoven showed that there exist transfers among cohort in the US
pay-as-you-go system. In other work at almost the same time, Boskin et al. showed that
there exist intergenerational redistributions as well as intergenerational redistribution in
the pay-as-you-go system in the US, and the rate of return is positive for at least the older
generations. Feldstein and Samwick showed that the marginal tax rate on social security
earning fell highest on women with a dependent spouse and were negative for men with a
dependent spouse. Liebman showed that the progressive rate of return on the US pay-asyou-go system depends not only on life-time earnings but also on other factors such as
marital status and life expectancy.
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The impact of a pay-as-you-go system on the fertility of the European countries
population and US population was analyzed by Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005).
They found that the application of a social security system in the US and Europe
stimulated parents to reduce the fertility. The higher the social security benefits, the lower
the fertility rates. Engelhard and Gruber (2004) observed the impact of a pay-as-you-go
system on the poverty of elderly population in the United States, and found that the
impact of pay-as-you-go in the poverty alleviation of older population in the US is
positive.
At present, research on social security systems and human capital is rare. The
most recent study that relates social security to human capital is by Ehrlich and Kim
(2005). By observing 57 countries over 32 years, they found that the implementation of
pay-as-you-go systems had an adverse effect on human capital formation. In their
regression method, they used three variables as dependent variables: the average
schooling year in population, the secondary school enrolment rate, and an international
test score measure. They found that social security had a negative impact on these
measures of human capital. Erlich and Kim also found that the system had adverse
impacts on family formation, fertility, and GDP per capita. The pay-as-you-go system
decreased marriage rates and increased divorce rates, it discouraged families from having
children, and government pension spending had an adverse effect on GDP per capita.

Studies of Social Security Systems in Developing Countries
The seminal work for analyzing the issues of pension policy in developing
countries is by James (1994). She proposed that countries with dual labor markets,
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including formal and informal sectors, should separate the purposes of redistribution and
the contribution-benefit link in running a pension program. In terms of policy matters, the
government is able to require taxes from workers and corporations in the formal sector
but not from those in the informal sector. Her suggestion is that governments in
developing countries should not implement a pay-as-you-go pension system, as pay-asyou-go systems combine the distribution purpose and savings purpose.
There are several reasons behind James’ suggestions. First, there is not sufficient
labor income in the formal sector to be charged for pension taxes. Thus, the tax amount
collected would not satisfy the minimum benefit amount distributed to the whole
pensioners from both formal and informal sector workers. In many developing countries,
the amount of labor in the formal sector is much smaller than that in the informal sector.
Second, there is no government guarantee in the future about the benefit received by the
contributors in the formal sectors that links to their contribution. The second condition is
predicted to lead to the evasion of social security contributions by workers in the formal
sector, either by suspending their participation or by moving to the informal sector.
James also proposed a type of multi-pillar system for pension programs in the
developing countries. The first is a universal social security system that break links
between benefit and contribution and covers everyone, i.e., all the retirees, from both
formal and informal sectors, and people who never went into the labor force in their life.
The first pillar is run by the government. The second pillar is a compulsory fully funded
defined contribution program for employees within certain brackets of income, which is
usually designed for employees who work in the formal sector and run by the government.
The third pillar is an additional voluntary fully funded defined contribution. Since it is
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voluntary, the program will be run by private institutions, and will be followed only by
certain employees in certain income brackets.
There is a great deal of literature about the experience of developing countries in
running pension programs. Linciano (2000) reviews theoretical issues and empirical
evidence from four different countries. Among these four countries, two are developing
countries: Chile and Argentina. Having suspended its unsustainable pay-as-you-go
system, Chile changed its pension system to a mixed system between fully funded and
pay-as-you-go, with the fully funded making about 87 percent of the total benefit (James
et al. 2003). Chile’s revised pension program is a mandatory fully funded individual
retirement account. Still, the government guarantees a minimum pension to participants
below a poverty line. Similarly, the pension reform in Argentina comprises a mixed
system between a private fully funded system, called capitalization regime (CR) and the
traditional pay-as-you-go system. The obvious advantage is the eligibility for the basic
benefits for male workers. Individuals are free to choose CR or the pay-as-you-go system.
Another example of a developing country with formal and informal labor sectors
is Brazil (Filho, 2005; Giambiagi and Mello, 2006). The Brazilian pension system is a
pay-as-you-go system with retirement contributions to the program paid by contributions
from both employees and employers. The Brazilian government also provides a minimum
pension benefit to employees, and no contribution is required for someone to be eligible
to receive benefits. Still, with the formal-informal labor market conditions, there exists
movement of labor from the formal labor market to the informal one.
Other studies are the pension reform in China (Agarwala, 1997; Dunaway and
Arora, 2007; Yuan and Feng, 2004).China’s pension system faced short-term as well as
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long-term problems. The short-term problem is the large amount of pension payments
required for the enormous number of Chinese civil servants. The long-term problem is
China’s rapidly increasing aging population. To cope with these problems, China
reformed its pension system in 1997. The reform comprises three pillars. The first pillar
is the traditional pay-as-you-go system where the government charges a tax on the
employers for the benefit of the employees. The second pillar is the mandatory fully
funded pension, paid by both employers and employee. The third pillar is the voluntary
fully funded pension. It is not clear at this point that these reforms have addressed the
short- and long-term problems.
There are not many studies on the redistribution effects in developing countries.
One good case of a mixed system between a pay-as-you-go and a funded collective
system is James et al. (2003) on Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Their research looked at
the distribution impact of pension reforms by gender. Their findings are that in the three
countries, women accumulated private annuities more than men after the reform.
However, this effect took place only because the new public pension pillar targeted the
low earner population, many of whom were women. As a result, low earning married
women were the biggest gainers from the pension reform.
There are also studies on the impact of social security reform on labor supply.
One excellent study is Edwards and Edwards (2002). They analyzed the impact of social
security reform on the labor market in Chile. Their findings are that reduction of job
security, decentralization of workers collective bargaining, and the privatization of social
security altogether reduced unemployment by 1 to 1.5 percent.
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All of the studies discussed above show that there are two important things to
consider when applying a pension program in developing countries. The first is the
sustainability of the pension program by looking at how the program financed itself. The
second is protection of the formal labor market from the movement of labor into an
informal one.

The Research Question
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the sustainability of an integrated
pension system for Indonesia, which may include a savings motive and a redistributive
motive. Sustainability here is defined as a system that can run in a long term. The
research question of focus is: Given the current state of the traditional economy in
Indonesia, where informal production and informal labor markets vastly occupy the
economy, how can a sustainable pension that achieves an increasing formal labor market
be designed and established?

The Methodology
Following the four purposes of dissertation, there are two methods applied. In
order to achieve the first and second purposes of the dissertation, I apply a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model of overlapping generation (OLG) developed by
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The software to be used in the model formulation is
generalized algebraic modeling system (GAMS). The written program for OLG-CGE in
GAMS is called the mathematical programming system for general equilibrium analysis
(MPSGE), developed by Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004). Meanwhile, heterogeneity of
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households in the model follows the one authored by Rausch and Rutherford
(forthcoming). The attach-to-GAMS solver to be used for solving the simultaneous
equations in the model is called a mixed complementary program (MCP), developed also
by Rutherford. Meanwhile, some parameters are estimated using econometric techniques,
with STATA software.
In order to achieve the third and fourth purposes, I apply an econometric method
combined with a linear algebra method. The econometric method is applied for
estimating the elasticity of government expenditure to skilled labor creation. The
software for the empirical work is STATA, and the software for the linear algebra
calculation is Microsoft Excel.

The Outline of Dissertation
The organization of the chapters is as follows. There are nine chapters in the
dissertation. Chapter One contains the fact of worldwide aging problems as a background
of pension reforms. This chapter also contains many reforms in pension policies that have
been taken worldwide, especially in the developing countries where formal and informal
production sectors and labor sectors exist. Studies of many types of pension systems and
reforms and the impact of aging population on pension are also discussed here.
Chapter Two discusses the characteristics and performances of many types of
pension systems, such as pay-as-you go versus fully funded, defined benefit versus
define- contribution, in both theory and practice in the developing countries.
Chapter Three contains a short discussion based on Law No. 40 /2004 of the
reform of Indonesian pension, which is a reform from the Pension Law No. 11/1969. The
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most important reform is pre-funding for all type of workers coverage, either workers in
the private sector or public sector, skilled and unskilled. This pre-funding issue is the one
that I translate as a cash transfer redistribution financed from consumption taxes.
The characteristics of workers and retirees in Indonesia are discussed in Chapter
Four. I develop a small open economy overlapping generation model for the Indonesian
mandatory pension system based on these characteristics of Indonesia. There are two
layers in the model. The first layer is a cash transfer for low income retirees, financed
from a consumption tax. The second layer is a mandatory fully funded pension. It is
expected that the cash transfers will be diminished gradually as workers are able to selffinance their own pension through the fully funded pension.
Chapter Five contains the analysis of data and the regression estimation of
parameters used in both linear algebra and CGE model. The macroeconomic data are
taken from the Indonesian year 2000 Social Accounting Matrix and various years of GDP
reports. The data on labor characteristics are taken from Central Board of Statistics
Indonesian Annual Labor Situation, various years. The data of the central government
budget are taken from the Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance.
Chapter Six includes the presentation of the budget impact of cash transfers and
the impact of skilled labor creation on government budget. The creation of skilled labor is
an important aspect in creating a strong pension system, either a defined benefit or a
defined contribution. The creation of skilled labor through university education will erase
the budget impact of cash transfer pensions and contributes to economic growth. Chapter
Seven discusses the result of calibration analysis. The calibration results consists of the
welfare distribution of tax burdens among generations and the amount of labor in the
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economy after the central government set consumption tax for cash transfer program. The
impacts of skilled labor creation, consumption taxes for the defined benefit pension, and
the fully funded savings pension program on economic growth are discussed in Chapter
Eight. Finally, the conclusions follow in Chapter Nine.

The Brief Summary of Results
There are three types of results presented in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight of this
dissertation. In Chapter Seven, I present some calculations regarding the impact of skilled
labor creation through university education on the central government budget. The result
presented in Chapter Seven is the calibration result on distribution of tax burden across
generation and the amount of labor after consumption tax for cash transfers and after
fully funded pension setup. Chapter Eight discusses the impacts of education spending up
to the university level, consumption taxes for defined benefit pensions, and the fully
funded savings pension on economic growth.
The results presented in Chapter Six regarding the skilled labor creation are
several. In order to eliminate 1.25 percent of unskilled labor every year, the central
government should increase its education expenditure by a minimum of 8 percent of the
annual budget from the previous less than 2 percent. The amount 1.25 percent of
unskilled labor is a proposed long run government program to eliminate 25 percent of
unskilled labor within 20 years. Currently, the central government has already increased
the average education expenditure to 4 percent annually. To increase education
expenditures to 8 percent of total government budget is an affordable task for the
Indonesian government. One way to achieve that target is by reducing the subsidy for
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consumption in Indonesia. From the year 2000 social accounting matrix, it is informed
that although the consumption tax rate reached 7.5 percent of total consumption, the
subsidy rate is actually slightly more than the tax rate. Therefore, reducing the
consumption subsidy is one way to change the pattern of government expenditure. In
addition, the creation of skilled labor will make laborers better able to finance their own
pension savings and thereby lessen the burden of pension cash transfers from central
government budget. It is expected that the creation of skilled labor, by eliminating 25
percent of unskilled labor, will save the government budget by Rp 100 trillion of cash
transfers in year 2040.
Chapter Seven presents two calibration results. The calibration results consist of
the calculation of distribution of tax burden across generations and also the amount of
labor supply before and after the taxation. Both results are calibrated under assumption
that laborers are able to adjust their working hours. Another important assumption is that
Indonesian economy is assumed to be a small open one. Either capital income financing
or labor income financing has the same welfare impact of taxation under optimized
working hours, from USD 1 per day per person cash transfer to USD 3 per day per person
cash transfer. The calibration of the labor amount before and after the increase of
consumption tax burden is also presented. The USD 1 cash transfer increases the largest
labor amount in the economy, both skilled and unskilled. For the setup of the fully funded
pension plan, 100 percent of labor income financing achieves the largest amount of labor
in the economy, for both skilled and unskilled labor.
Finally in Chapter Eight, education spending up to the university level in order to
eliminate 25 percent of the size of informal labor sectors would increase the GDP by 3.1
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percent. However, the consumption taxes and the fully funded pension taxes would likely
decrease the current economic growth but increase the future one.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Social Security System:
Characteristics and Performances
There are four ways to classify social security systems. One way is to classify
how people support themselves when retired, a classification known as “pillar systems”.
Another way is to explore how the social security funds are collected. A third way is to
discuss which part of the payment is defined by the government, either the contribution
(defined contribution) or the benefit part (defined benefit). One last classification is
whether the social security payment is obligatory or not.
Utilizing the pillar system (James, 2004), I divide the system into three pillars. It
is called the pillar system because it explores which source (s) of income supports the
living of the retired. The first pillar is known as the “public mandatory unfunded pay-asyou-go” pension plan. The second pillar is the “mandatory funded collective” pension
plan. The third pillar is known as a “voluntary private” pension plan. Table 3 elaborates
more details regarding the pillar system.
From the classification of collecting funds, we divide the social security system
into “unfunded” versus “funded” (Blake, 2000; Feldstein and Liebman, 2002; Kuné, 2001;
Sinn, 2000). Unfunded means the government charges taxes on the wage income of the
current working generation and transfers the funds as benefits to the current retired
generation. The unfunded system is also known as the pay-as-you-go system. Funded
means the central government (or any private institution on behalf of the government)
charges a tax on the wage income of current working generation, deposits the funds into
an asset market to earn annuities from it, and then in the future pays back the principal
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and its accumulated annuities to the same person when s/he becomes retired. Readers
may refer to the Appendix A for additional information regarding the plan.
Classifying the system into benefits and contributions, the social security system
may be divided as “defined benefit” versus “defined contribution”. Defined benefit
means that the central government sets a certain standard for benefit payments for the
older population. This system is usually connected to the pay-as-you-go system. Defined
contribution means the central government sets a certain standard for contribution
payment from the working population. A defined contribution system is usually linked to
the funded collective system (Feldstein and Liebman, 2002).
As the central government determines pension payment obligation, a social
security system may be classified as “mandatory” versus “voluntary”. The central
government sets an obligation for the working generation to pay the social security taxes
in the mandatory arrangement. Individuals set their own pension accounts at private
pension institutions, and set their own pension payments according to their agreement
with the institutions in a voluntary arrangement.
The definitions that I discuss are introductions to further discussions in Chapter
Two regarding the characteristics and performances of each system. Performances relate
to characteristics and the social economy of the country where it is applied. In later
sections of Chapter Two, I elaborate the application of pension systems in the developing
countries as examples of performances of social security systems related to their
characteristics.
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Table 3. The Pillars of Old Age Income Security
Mandatory Publicly
Mandatory
Voluntary Pillar
(3)
Managed Pillar
Privately Managed
Pillar
(1)
(2)
- Co-insurance
- Co-insurance
- Co-insurance
Objectives
- Redistribution
- Increase savings - Increase savings
Form

Financing

- Flat
- Means-tested
- Minimum pension
guarantee
Tax financed

- Personal savings - Personal savings
plan
plan
- Occupational plan - Occupational plan
Regulatory fully
funded

Fully funded

Source: James (2004)

Characteristics of the Social Security System
It is important to study the characteristics of the afore-mentioned social security
system. By studying the characteristics, we are able to know how the implementation of
each system affects the welfare of a given society. Below is the elaboration of the
characteristics of each system. I elaborate the characteristics of an unfunded pay-as-yougo system compared to a funded collective system, and a defined benefit system in
comparison with a defined contribution system.

Unfunded and Funded System Characteristics
Characteristics of a Mandatory Unfunded Pay-as-you-go System There are five
important characteristics of a mandatory pay-as-you-go system that are important for
policy analysis in order for the system to work well (Blake, 2000).
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The first characteristic is a defined benefit, and it weakens the link between
contributions and benefits as in fact it is possible that the individuals gain more benefits
than what they paid in contributions. The first characteristic is strongly connected to the
second, or the size of formality of the labor market. A large formal labor sector is
important in implementing the pay-as-you-go pension program because a formal labor
sector means the central government has access to charge taxes on labor. Let us assume
that taxpayers understand how the system works, and assume that there is a large amount
of informality in the labor market. The workers in the formal labor sector would then
move to the informal labor sector, avoiding government taxes, as they would understand
that the pension benefits received are lower than the contributions paid.
A third characteristic, intergenerational distribution is defined as the distribution
of income from higher-income individuals to the lower-income individuals across cohorts.
Intragenerational distribution is defined as the distribution of income from higher-income
individuals to the lower-income individuals in the same cohort. These third
characteristics take place because of the defined benefit characteristic noted above.
The fourth characteristic is that the pay-as-you-go system has the joint purpose of
savings and redistribution. Savings and redistribution are not separable in the system as
the contributions paid are not earmarked taxes because the current working generation
pays the pensions of the current retired generation. The redistribution takes place among
the retirees while savings take place among the working generation.
The fifth characteristic is the sustainability of the system due to population aging.
As the system includes the transfer of income from the working generation to the old
generation, a decline of the working generation relative to an increase of the retired
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generation will cause the amount of income transfer to become relatively smaller.
Eventually, the amount may not be sufficient to be distributed to the retired generation.
Characteristics of a Mandatory Funded Collective Plan. To make a parallel comparison
with the pay-as-you-go system, I include five important characteristics of the mandatory
funded collective plan that are similar to the pay-as-you-go characteristics mentioned
above.
Defined contribution, the first characteristic, strengthens the relationship between
the contributions paid and the benefits received. Under a defined contribution plan,
individuals open their own pension account and set the monthly amount paid. Under
certain contracts when retired, the same individuals collect the benefits from their own
account. They can then calculate the benefits received from the contributions paid and
calculate the relationship between the two.
Like the pay-you-go system, the funded collective plan works best under a formal
labor market. The funded collective system needs continual monthly deposits from the
contributors, i.e., the people involved have stable incomes. The formal labor sector
guarantees that labor have a steady income, compared to those who work in the informal
labor sector.
Since benefits in the funded collective system are received by the same
individuals who contributed, then it has a savings, rather than a redistribution, motive.
Moreover, there is no impact of an aging problem on the system because the contribution
does not depend on the current working generation but had already been paid in the past
by the same individuals.
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Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution System
Defined Benefit (DB) Plan. A defined benefit (DB) plan offers an assured income
replacement ratio in retirement. Still, this is the case only for workers who remain with
the same employer for their whole career. Blake (2000) found that in the UK, average
workers change jobs about six times in a lifetime. Every time workers switch jobs, they
experience a ”portability” loss in respect to their pension entitlement. This is because DB
plans are generally provided by specific employers, and when workers change jobs, they
have to move to a new employer’s plan.
Defined Contribution (DC) Plan. According to Blake, the characteristics of a defined
contribution plan have two different stages: the accumulation and the decumulation
stages.

The Accumulation Stage
–

DC has the advantage of complete portability when workers change jobs.
However, individual DC schemes tend to have much higher operating costs
than occupational DB schemes. Occupational DC schemes have lower
operating costs than occupational DB schemes due to structural simplicity.

–

Individual DC schemes, although portable between jobs, are not fully portable
between plan providers or even between different investment funds operated
by the same provider.

–

Total contributions into the DC plans tend to be much lower than the ones into
the DB plans.
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–

DC plans have explicit (contributor burden) asset risks and other types of risks,
such as ill-health, disability, and death-in-service. In DB plans, these risks are
carried by the plan sponsor, not the retiree. This implies additional cost for
workers to purchase insurance to gain such protection.

The Decumulation Stage
Private sector DC plans will generate a high amount for retiree only if the
annuities market works well. In that context, the value of pension assets will be positively
related to the value of financial assets. Meanwhile, financial asset markets contain
volatilities, from future investment return, real earning growth rates, and inflation rates.

The Summary of Social Security System Characteristics
To summarize, we may ask several questions as to why a certain social security
system or combination of several systems might be implemented.
The first question concerns why a government usually sets a mandatory pension
system. There are several reasons why mandatory pension may be chosen. The first is to
force people to protect themselves for retirement, reducing the burden of the government
and society as a whole. Another reason is to smooth the consumption of the older
population. Finally, the system protects the older population from external shocks (e.g.,
the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia). Table 4 presents a summary of the relationships
between pension systems.
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Table 4. The Cross Table of Social Security System
Funded
Defined contribution

Defined benefit

Unfunded

Employees have individual
investment accounts to which
they and/or their employers
make periodic deposits.

Employees credit
individuals’ account with the
taxes that they and their
employers pay and then
accumulate these sums with
an implicit rate of interest.

Countries applying the system:
Chile, Mexico, Argentina and
Australia
Companies accumulate funds
in pension accounts and pay
benefits to retirees

Countries applying the
system: Sweden and Italy.
The current working
generation is being taxed,
and the amount is paid to the
current retired generation

Countries applying the system: Countries applying the
U.S. (states government and system: U.S. and most
corporate pension plans)
European Countries
Source: Feldstein and Liebman (2002)

The second question is which system governments typically choose. There are
three economic reasons for choosing a pay-as-you-go system: it has redistribution effects,
it serves as co-insurance for the older population, and it has low administrative costs
because of the economies of scale of running a large pension program that applies to
most individuals.
There are four economic reasons for choosing a funded system. First, a funded
system tends to increase national savings. Second, it may develop a capital market during
the implementation, since the collected fund must be invested in the asset market in order
to get annuities. However, the second reason does not take place in all countries because
it still depends on how the government develops the capital market. In addition, like a
pay-as-you-go system, it also serves as co-insurance for the older population. Finally,
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because it is flexible in terms of provision, it is not affected by the demographic situation
(i.e., aging population).

The Performance of Social Security Systems
For the purpose of reform, we should evaluate the performance of each system
during their implementation period. In addition, evaluating performance is one way to
compare the empirical facts with characteristics previously mentioned. There are three
principles for performance evaluation. The first principle is individual equity: the present
value of the taxes paid and the present value of the benefit received in the future are at
least equal for individual. Redistribution as the second principle comprises redistribution
within cohorts (intragenerational redistribution) and redistribution across cohorts
(intergenerational redistribution). The third is the impact of each system on economic
growth, including the function of each social security system in poverty alleviation.

The Performance of the Mixed System. A mixed system that combines the mandatory
unfunded pay-as-you-go system with the mandatory funded collective is mostly
implemented in South American countries (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Mexico). Even though
it is defined as a mixed system, the funded collective plan is usually more dominant than
the unfunded plan. For each country, more than 80 percent of accumulated funds go into
the funded system. This is because the system has often replaced the traditional pay-asyou-go system that was run in those countries before the reform but that collapsed
because of institutional weaknesses.
Edwards and Edwards (2000; 2002) found that the implementation of a mixed
system in Chile increased the wages of labor in the informal sector by 2 percent. The
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reform itself made contributions in the reduction of Chile’s aggregate unemployment,
even though small. James et al. (2003) discussed the changing effects of a mixed system
in three countries, Argentina, Chile and Mexico. The most important finding is that the
reform significantly increased the welfare of the under-educated workers, especially
women. Women also received more from redistributions than men did after the reform.
The works of Edwards and Edwards and James et al. on mixed social security
systems show that the reform of social security systems in Latin America is able to
increase the welfare of the population. The success of funded systems in Latin America
in some ways suggests that countries with a pay-as-you-go pension system should change
to funded systems, given the current decline of the amount of working population that
threatens the sustainability of most unfunded pay-as-you-go systems.

The Summary of Social Security Systems’ Performance
By observing the performance of each system, it can be seen that each system has
made positive contributions towards the welfare of the population of each country. I
conclude that the real problem of implying a social security system is not that one system
is better to another, but whether and how well each system fits the socio-economic and
demographic conditions of each country and the level of solidity of administering pension
institutions. Without such awareness, implementation of social security systems will only
face similar troubles to those seen in the Latin American countries, such as underreported incomes, huge implicit debt, funds embezzlement, failure to pay pension
benefits, and the like
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CHAPTER THREE
The State of the Indonesian Social Security Program

Indonesia, the fourth most populated country in the world, is a country in crisis. It
was hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Within two years after that, the financial
crisis grew into a broader economic crisis. There were four Asian countries hit by
financial crises at the time – Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand – but only
Indonesia could not get out of the crisis until recently.
The explanation is because the Indonesian government is poor, it lacks funds to
thwart the crisis, and the population is also quite poor. Corruption is rampant. At the time,
the Indonesian people lack the public life-support in terms of the availability of well-paid
jobs, a low provision of public education, a low provision of public health care, and the
lack of a social security system for the retired population. Even today, the poverty rate in
Indonesian regencies (comparable to county levels in the US government structure) is
over 80 percent of the population living below the poverty line. However, per capita
income has grown up to USD 1280 per capita in 2005 from USD 972 in 1998 (World
Development Indicators 2006, 2006), exceeding the level at the beginning of the crisis.
One of the results of the economic crisis was that it forced changes in the political
regime in Indonesia. Before, the Suharto regime controlled all the public and government
institutions, from Parliament to the judiciary. Today, the political situation in Indonesia is
more democratic. The political parties are not controlled anymore, and people are able to
vote freely for the President as well as the Parliament. The judiciary has also become
more independent, and the Parliament is now focused more on the public interest by
generating legislation that is helpful for the public, such as pension law.
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There are two important laws regarding pension in Indonesia. They are Law No.
11/1969 about the pension for civil servant and Law No. 40/2004 about the national
social security system. Although it still has no sub-implementation law, Law No. 40/2004
reforms a national pension system. Before, even though pension institutions existed in
Indonesia, there was no integrated pension system. In addition, according to population
projections by the United Nations, Indonesia faces a rapidly ageing population, and Law
No. 40/2004 is important in facing this aging phenomenon in Indonesia.
The commonly used indicator for ageing is the ratio of working population (age
15-59) to elderly population (age 60+). For Indonesia, in year 2000, the ratio is 8.1, so
that there are 8 workers able to support the pension benefit of 1 retiree. In 2025, the ratio
is projected to decline to 5.0, and to 2.6 in 2050. The trend is declining for the next 50
years.
Currently, there is no mandatory pension system in Indonesia. Voluntary pension
programs are many, offered by many private pension funds. The Indonesian government
itself has four state-owned social security enterprises. Those are PT. Jaminan Sosial
Tenaga Kerja (Jamsostek, a life insurance for private sectors worker), PT. Tabungan
Asuransi Sosial Pegawai Negri (Taspen, a pension institution for the civil servants), PT.
Asuransi ABRI (Asabri, an insurance and pension institution for the member of armed
forces), and PT. Asuransi Kesehatan (Askes, a health insurance institution).

Description of the Proposed System
The proposed framework as stipulated in Law No. 40/2004 consists of the
following:
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1. Five mandatory programs, namely work-accident protection, life insurance,
provident fund, pension, and health maintenance programs.
2. All-worker coverage, including informal workers, with gradual inclusion.
3. Pre-funding for all programs.
4. A tripartite board to assist the President in formulating policies on a national
social security system.
5. Several state companies to run the program.

The Mandatory Programs
Among the five proposed programs, the provident fund and the pension program
are the most relevant to discuss. In the proposed programs, employers and employees
would pay contributions to the provident fund. The rate of contributions would be
determined by a set of government regulations. Benefits are the accumulations of
contributions with interest. They will be paid in lump sum as early as five years before
normal retirement age. Participants may borrow from the provident fund by pledging
their benefits. However, this type of borrowing can only be done after a certain minimum
period of participation.
The proposed pension program is a defined benefit type. A participant will be
entitled to monthly pension if s/he has at least 15 years of contribution. The benefit
formula will be prescribed in government regulations, and minimum benefits will also be
set. If someone contributes for less than 15 years, the incumbent will only get
accumulated contributions. The pension program will also require contributions of equal
proportions from employers and employees, as determined in government regulations. It

34

is not clear how the rate will be adjusted to respond to the potential emergence of
surpluses and deficits.

Critical Review on the Proposed System
Below are critical reviews of the current law, according to Rachmatawarta (2004).
By the time the critical views were issued in year 2004, he had become the Director of
Pension Funds, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia.

1.

The proposed provident fund is designed very much like existing provident funds

under the current Jamsostek program. As benefits are paid in lump sum and may even be
withdrawn prior to retirement, the program is very unlikely to maintain income after
retirement. The possibility of pledging the benefits for cash borrowing will even hamper
the intention to provide protection of income during old age. Experience shows that many
people tend to cash in their financial rights as soon as possible if they are allowed to do
so, and soon use up the money unwisely.

2.

It can be argued that the purpose of providing lump sum benefits upon retirement

under the provident fund program competes with the purpose of severance payment as
required by the labor law. If so, both employers and workers have to set aside funds for
the same purpose. Unless substitution of benefits is allowed, having two similar programs
prescribed in two different laws demands further cost and benefit analysis.
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3.

Fifteen-year vesting under the proposed pension program is of course better than

20-year vesting under the current civil service pension program. However, it is still a very
long vesting period compared to the one prescribed in Law No. 11/1992 on pension funds.
This long vesting period may demote the pension program in the wider framework of old
age income protection. A mandatory pension program should be able to offer an income
floor for as many persons as possible (with the risk of higher level of funding).

4.

Opting-out from the provident fund and pension programs will not be allowed. It

will discourage employers who already have a voluntary pension program to sustain the
program. The total costs for the pension promises will become too high for employers to
bear. As pension benefit formula and level of contributions to the provident fund are not
prescribed in the draft law, so that an early assessment of total costs is not possible. If
pension benefits and provident fund contributions are set high in government regulations,
the existence of a voluntary pension program will definitely be adversely affected.
Employers will tend to satisfy their obligation to the mandatory program before thinking
of funding a voluntary one.

5.

Charging and collecting pension contributions with variable rates will be very

difficult. Socialization of the rates of pension contributions will have to be carried out
regularly. Employers and workers will ask for frequent adjustments in contributions,
which may have to be made due to surplus/deficits of the programs. They may even
become very sensitive to financial conditions of the program.

36

6.

Policy and strategy to maintain the financial health of the pension program are

only vaguely described in the draft law. As mentioned earlier, no description has been
made on who will be responsible for any deficits that would occur, although it seems
clear that government will likely be held responsible to deal with emerging deficits. The
likelihood is more obvious if the program to cover informal and poorly remunerated
workers.

7.

Confusion shall be anticipated in transforming the existing endowment insurance

plan for civil servants and members of armed forces to either the provident fund or the
pension program. Transformation to the provident fund will involve actuarial calculation
of individual rights and replenishments of any deficits. It is the government who should
cover the deficits. On the other hand, transformation to the pension program will need
socialization regarding a change in the method of benefit and payment. The majority of
civil servants and members of the armed forces will want to preserve the lump sum
payment of endowment insurance benefits, instead of having only the monthly pension.

8.

The lack of a clear transitional plan from various existing programs to the

proposed system will create uncertainty among the management and employees of PT.
Taspen, PT. Asabri, and PT. Jamsostek. Private employers and workers will also be
encouraged to evade paying contributions for Jamsostek program.

9.

Commercial interest of banks and life insurance companies on pension provision

will be affected. They may argue against the proposed social security system, and in
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10.

Taxation of contributions and benefits is not described. The companies managing

the programs may not be taxed at all. Although it is understood that taxation is more
appropriately taken care of within tax legislation, proper descriptions of a general
framework of taxation may avoid ad-hoc treatment that frequently happened in the
implementation of the Jamsostek program, the pension program, and endowment
insurance plan for civil servants and members of armed forces as well as voluntary
private pension programs. Ad-hoc treatments may have contributed to the lack of
motivation to participate in pension programs.

Matching the Simulation and the Reforms
Compared to Law No. 11/1969, there are two reforms of the pension system in
Law No. 40/2004. The first one is the coverage of a pension for all workers, including
those who work in the informal sectors. The second reform is the prefunding of the
pension system. As has already been noted in Chapter One, prefunding means that the
government finances the pension benefit of the workers not from the pension tax but from
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other tax sources, such as consumption taxes. A consumption tax is a policy that can be
taken in the short term by the central government to provide a minimum amount of
pensions. This is the redistribution part of the simulation, which is also the first part of
simulation. I demonstrate how this type of tax and transfer affects labor amount in the
formal production sector, for both skilled and unskilled labor. Meanwhile, the building
block of the long run pension program is a fully funded program. The second part of the
simulation is how the fully funded savings pension system affects the composition of
labor, skilled and unskilled, in the formal production sector. The simulation is done by
assuming that both skilled and unskilled labors have control over their working hours as
the central government sets consumption taxes.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Overlapping Generation Model

The model used is the Overlapping Generation (OLG) model with heterogeneous
agents, labor in the formal sector, and labor in the informal sector. The OLG model itself
follows the initial work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The heterogeneous OLG is
considered an apt OLG model to catch the picture of developing countries with a dual
economy, formal and informal sectors of labor and goods markets. Avitabile (2003)
presents examples of modeling informality with heterogeneous agents.
Neri (as cited by Filho, 2005) suggested that the main difference between formal
and informal jobs concerns taxes and labor costs. In Indonesia, where tax evasion is very
high due to the low law enforcement, employers choose to do business in the formal
sector only if their firm is sufficiently large (e.g., employment exceeds 10 employees
with sufficient capital), so that the government is able to deal with them and charge them
taxes, or only if the firm wishes to be in the formal sector, say, to get the bank lending
with low interest rates. This behavior explains the vast amount of labor in the formal
sector (65 percent of the total labor).
The main purpose of this model is to construct the consumption behavior of the
Indonesian household members among young workers (age 21-55) and old pensioners
(56-65). As has been shown by Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2001; 2002; forthcoming), the
characteristic of a typical family in Indonesia is co-residing between the young worker
and the older parents. They also show that there are cash transfers from the young to the
old. Still, they also found that the Indonesian older population is often working at the age
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when they are supposed to retire. They found that the co-residency is only part of the
culture, which could break down in the future, while the amount of transfers might be too
little to support the need of the old. United Nations made estimates that by the year 2025
the Indonesian aged population (age 60+) will be increased by 100 percent, while the
amount of total population will decrease.
I use the model to simulate proposed reforms of the Indonesian pension system.
Before we proceed, readers may ask what is so important about the pension program for
Indonesian retired population. Table 4.1 reveals that pension income is the largest amount
of income of the retired population, whether they continue to work or retire after the
retirement age 55.

Table 5. Indonesia Men’s Monthly Income (Thousand Rp.)
41-55

Age Group
56-65

66-75

Employed in 1993
Median own labor income
Fraction receiving any other income (%)
Fraction receiving any other labor income (%)
Median per capita other labor income
Fraction receiving transfers (%)
Median per capita amount transferred
Fraction receiving pension income (%)
Median government pension amount
Number of observation (people)

133.1
83
64
16.2
54
3.1
2
274.6
1393

54.9
90
68
11.4
64
3.6
6
255.9
527

33.2
89
64
12.2
66
3.6
6
213.3
202

Not Employed in 1993
Fraction receiving any income (%)
Fraction receiving any other labor income (%)
Median per capita other labor income
Fraction receiving transfers (%)
Median per capita amount transferred
Fraction receiving pension income (%)
Median government pension amount
Number of observation (people)

85
61
27.4
52
2.3
15
151.3
54

91
59
27.1
62
6.0
38
235.2
106

89
54
26.2
60
8.6
25
217.9
102

Source: McKee (2006), calculated from the Indonesian Family Life Survey 1993. Table is reprinted with author’s permission.
Note: the average exchange rate: in 1997 1USD = Rp. 2500, in 1993 1USD = Rp. 2000.
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Because pensions are the largest amount of income, and by itself the largest
portion of income for the retirees, it becomes the most important source of income for the
retirees. Most pension income is received from the government. Table 4.1 shows that
the group of people who continue to work at the age they are supposed to retire usually
do not receive pension income. Table 4.1 also shows also that only 6 percent of people
still employed in the age group 56-65 received pension income, compared to 38 percent
of those not employed of the same age group. Therefore, it is important to propose a
pension program for Indonesia.
The integrated system proposed in the model consists of two pillars. The first
pillar is a minimum subsistence cash transfer plan from the central government, with a
defined benefit characteristic for the minimum physical needs of the retirees. The
program is needed at least in the short run. The second is a long run mandatory fully
funded savings plan that links the contribution and the benefit. Brook and Whitehouse
(2006), in evaluating the performance of pension system in Turkey, state the importance
of an integrated pension system for an economy with formal and informal labor sectors.
The two systems are proposed together since I separate the redistribution purpose
of applying a defined benefit system, from the purpose of strengthening the link between
contributions and benefits that exist under a fully funded system. Corsetti and SchmidtHebbel (1997) state that the separation between the two gives a third implication: the
replacement of the implicit intergenerational debt of a pay-as-you-go system by an
explicit personal debt in the fully-funded system.
The source of funds for redistribution are assumed to be taken from an indirect tax
like the consumption tax, either value added taxes (VAT) or excise taxes, since these
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kinds of taxes break the link between the benefit and contribution that exists in the
mandatory pay-as-you-go system. The logic behind the choice of a consumption tax is
straightforward. A consumption tax, either a gross receipts tax, a sales tax, or a value
added tax, reduces consumption of the consumers who have income. From the
macroeconomy perspective, by taxing the consumers’ budget and transferring the amount
to the population in need, the central government does not reduce the whole consumption
but redistributes the income.
Using other kinds of taxes to finance a defined benefit plan will bring many issues
to the program. Using income and payroll taxes to finance such a program brings the
issue of the link between the contribution and the benefit. Taxing corporate income to
finance a defined benefit plan will make many firms operating in the formal sector move
to the informal sector, while taxing payroll income stimulates labor to do the same.
Taxing capital income especially in a developing country like Indonesia, is also very
difficult. The property tax is a possible choice, but these taxes are collected by local
governments.
Regarding the pension program that links the contribution and the benefit as a
second pillar, I simulate the application of mandatory fully funded system in the formal
sector. This is the building block for the long run pension program in Indonesia.
.
The Model
Agents are born with zero assets and have different productivity due to their age.
Households are endowed with 1 unit of labor. Labor will try to enter the formal sector if
possible, since the wages are higher there and workers also received some other benefits,
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such as fringe benefits. Still, the formal sector, either private or government, is not easy
to access. The education and human relationship of workers play important roles in
determining their ability to enter the formal sector. From the income they make, labor
decides how much to consume, how much to save, and how much to transfer to the
parents.
Agents live from age 1 to age 65. Here I assume that agents die at age 66, which
follows Indonesian life expectancy. Their productivity characteristics are determined by
age and experience. In determining the productivity characteristics of labor, I follow the
method of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 1

Preferences, Endowments, and Technology
The households have preferences over the homogeneous consumption good and
leisure, given by the following:
65

(1)

∑ β [u (c
t =0

j

t +i

, l t +i )]

The symbol β j is the present value function of the utility function u(.). The symbol ct and
lt are consumption and leisure, respectively. The subscript t denotes the time period.
The OLG model comprises the working and retired generations endowed with
initial assets ownership and one unit of time that they are able to allocate between work
and leisure. The annual utility function of agents is given by the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) function:

1

Another method in determining the labor productivity idiosyncratic is by applying the Markov calibration
procedure to the labor data.
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(2)

⎡ −ρ
u ( c t , l t ) = ⎢c t +
⎣

(1 − ε )

ε

lt

−ρ

⎤
⎥⎦

where ε is the time allocated for working,

−

1

ρ

(1 − ε )

ε

is the ratio of time between leisure

and working (also represents the shadow price for leisure), ct is consumption, and l t is
leisure. The symbol ρ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.
The idiosyncratic labor productivity (Productivity Index) for Indonesia is given by
the following function:
(3)

[

]

PI ( A) = Exp 8.4493 + 0.1128 * A − 0.0012 * A 2 / Exp (8.4493)

This productivity index follows the model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The
productivity index measures the productivity of labor according to age and wages. It is a
linear combination between skilled and unskilled labor in the formal sector only. I
assume that the productivity index is positively related to age A, but negatively related to
the square of age A2. This means that the production capacity of labor increases at the
beginning, has its peak at a certain age (age 47), and after that goes down until the worker
retires.
I estimate the productivity index for Indonesia by using raw labor age and wages
data from 1998-2002. The data are taken in that time range as the dynamic CGE model
starts from year 2000, so that the labor data fit the data around the year 2000. In addition,
the amount of samples from five year intervals satisfies the minimum amount of samples
to do the estimation. The estimation result is presented in Chapter Five.
There are two sectors in the economy, the formal and informal sectors, with two
types of labor, skilled labor Ls and unskilled labor Lu. Both skilled labor and unskilled
labor work in the formal sector, while only unskilled labor works in the informal sector.
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It should be noted that, the year 2000 labor data (presented in Chapter Five) show that
there is a small amount of skilled labor in the informal sector (0.5 percent of total labor).
Because the amount is small, I ignore the role of the skilled labor in the informal sector.
According to Margono and Sharma (2004), the production function in Indonesia
can be modeled according to the Cobb-Douglass production technology. The formal
sector produces with the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
(4)

α

YF = F ( K F , LF ) = Z F K F LγSF LωUF

Variable YF is the value added of the formal sector, and ZF is the technology level of the
production function in the formal sector. The symbol α is the elasticity of production of
capital, γ is the elasticity of production of skilled labor, and θ is the elasticity of
production of unskilled labor, with the sum of α, γ, and ω equal to 1.
The informal sector has a labor intensive technology with capital and unskilled
labor:
(5)

YI = F ( K I , L I ) = Z I K Iα L I

ω

Variable YI is the value added of the informal sector, and AI is the technology level of the
production function in the informal sector. Equation (5) follows the Cobb-Douglas
production function with a low value of α for the production elasticity of capital, as the
informal sector production function is labor intensive. The sum of α and ω is equal to 1.

The Households Sector

The working generations in the formal sector have to choose their consumption ct ,
the risk free assets holding at and the number of hours to work. The utility function
follows a constant elasticity of substitution function.
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The value function of skilled workers in the formal sector is:
(6)

V F (t , a.L) = max { u (ct , l t ) + φ [V (t + 1, at , L ] }
c , a ,l

Variable t (time) represents labor’s age and variable L is the working hour of labor. The
value of φ is between and inclusive 0 and 1. The state and control variable in the model is
variable time t, variable asset at, and variable L.
The budget constraint of the agent is:
(7)

[

]

(1 + τ c ) ct + Tr + a t +1 ≤ at 1 + r (1 − τ k ) + (1 − τ w ) wF LF + TG

Variable τc is the consumption tax, τk is the tax on capital income and τw is the tax on
labor income. Variable TG is the transfer from government to households Tr is the income
transfer from worker to parents. As I simulate the increase of consumption taxes, the
consumption expenditures ct becomes an important variable. I assume that skilled
workers in the formal sector spend all their consumption expenditures on the goods
produced in the formal sector only and pay consumption taxes. This assumption holds as
informal sector goods are inferior relative to income due to low production quality. The
higher the income is, the lesser the choice of consuming informal goods.
The value function of unskilled workers in the formal and informal sector is:
(8)

V I (t , a, L) = max { u (ct , lt ) + φ [V (t + 1, at , L ] }
c , a ,l

while the budget constraint of the agents is:
(9)

[

]

(1 + τ c ) θ ct + (1 − θ ) ct + Tr + at +1 ≤ at 1 + r (1 − τ k ) + wI LI

Unskilled workers in the formal and informal sector do not pay labor taxes but pay
capital income taxes because they could only put their assets in formal financial
institutions. They neither receive the government pension benefits nor participate in the
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employee’s voluntary fully funded pension program. For unskilled workers in the
informal sector, most of their wages are very low, lower than the wages of unskilled labor
in the formal sector. Meanwhile, both type of workers still receive transfers from the
government. In addition to differences in wages and wages taxes, the consumption
expenditures of the workers in the informal sector are split into consumption expenditures
on goods produced in the formal sector and goods produced in the informal sector.
Parameter θ is a consumption expenditure coefficient with a value between and inclusive
of 0 and 1. The workers pay consumption taxes when they consume goods produced in
the formal sector but not when they consume goods produced in the informal sector.
The first order condition with respect to consumption for skilled labor households
in the formal sector is given by:

(10)

∂VF ⎡ − ρ ε − ρ ⎤
= ct + l t ⎥
λ
∂C t ⎢⎣
⎦

−

1+ ρ

ρ

ct− (1+ ρ ) − φ (1 + τ c )

The first order condition with respect to consumption for unskilled labor households in
the formal and informal sectors is given by:

(11)

∂VI ⎡ − ρ ε − ρ ⎤
= ct + l t ⎥
λ
∂C t ⎢⎣
⎦

−

1+ ρ

ρ

ct− (1+ ρ ) − φ θ (1 + τ c ) − φ (1 −θ )

The first order condition with respect to leisure for the three types of households is given
by:

(12)

∂VF , I
∂l t

⎡ − ρ (1 − ε ) − ρ ⎤
lt ⎥
= ⎢c t +
ε
⎦
⎣

−

1+ ρ

ρ

(1 − ε )

ε

lt− (1+ ρ )

Readers can see that, while the first order condition with respect to leisure is the same for
all types of households, the first order condition with respect of consumption is different.
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These differences will imply different choices of optimal consumption and leisure,
respectively.
The movement of labor from the formal sector to the informal sector, or the other
way around, takes place as they maximize their value function V (t, a, L):
(13)

V (t , a, L) = max {V F (t , a, L), V I (t , a, L)}

Labor will stay in the formal sector if VF (.) ≥ VI (.). They will stay in the informal sector
if VF (.) < VI (.).
The last agents in the households are the retired agents. They retire at age 55, and
for simplicity they are assumed to die at age 65. For unskilled labor, either from the
formal sector or the informal sector, most of the retirees need to work to support
themselves. They have difficulties generating savings while they are young, since their
income is only sufficient for the consumption of the family. For skilled labor, there are
transitions of labor from the government sector and from the private sector after the
agents retired. McKee (2006) stated that around 50 percent of government employees
move into either the private sector or self-employment after they retire, while around 61
percent of private sector workers move into self-employment after they retire. Selfemployment for labor falls in the area of informal sector. Given such conditions, the
value function for the retired population in Indonesia is:
(14)

V R (t , a, S , L) = max { u (ct , lt ) + φ [V (t + 1, a t , S t , L] }
c , a ,l

with a budget constraint defined as :
(15)

[

]

(1 + τ c ) θ ct + (1 − θ ) ct ≤ a 1 + r (1 − τ k ) + wI LI + P + S

Variable P is the pension benefit they receive from the government (e.g., the
redistribution benefit), and variable S is their own savings or the fully funded pension of
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their own. The first order conditions for consumption and leisure of the retired population
are the same as in equations (11) and (12), respectively.

The Firm Sectors

The single representative firm in the formal sector maximizes the following profit
function:
(16) max Π F ( wF , r ) = (1 − τ F ) F ( K , L) − (1 − τ w ) ws F Ls F − wu F Lu F − ( rF + δ F ) K F − p m M
K ,L

where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, r the interest rate, τ F is the corporate income
tax, and τ w is the skilled labor income tax. Variable pm is the price of imported
production material, variable M is the imported amount of production material. The
unskilled labor income is usually below the taxable amount of labor income. The first
order conditions with respect to capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor give,
respectively:
(17)

F1 ' ( K F , LF ) =

(rF + δ F )
1−τ F

(18)

F2 ' ( K F , LF ) =

(1 − t w ) ws F
1−τ F

(19)

F3 ' ( K F , LF ) =

wu F
1−τ F

The representative firm in the informal sector maximizes the following profit
function:
(20)

max Π I ( wI , rI ) = F ( K I , LI ) − (rI + δ I ) K I − wu I Lu I
L
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I assume that the capital is not accumulated in the long run production function in the
informal sector. The first order condition for the firm in the informal sector with respect
to capital is given by:
(21)

F1 ' ( K I , LI ) = rI + δ I

Note that the interest rate and depreciation rate in the informal sector are different from
the ones in the formal sector. The informal sector interest rate rI is higher than the formal
sector interest rate rF due to lending risk in the informal sector, such as weak lending
contract. The formal and informal capital markets are weakly separated. The capital in
the formal production sector comes from the formal capital market, while the capital in
the informal production sector comes from the informal capital market. However, the
capital might move from the formal capital market to informal capital market.
The first order condition for the representative firm in the informal sector with
respect to unskilled labor is:
(22)

F2 ' ( K I , LI ) = wI

For simplification, a penalty for a formal firm wittingly operating in the informal sector is
not included because law enforcement in Indonesia is weak.
I also allow the movement of firms from the formal sector to informal sector, or
the other way around. The movement of firms between sectors is a function of profit
maximization Π (w, r):
(23)

Π ( w, r ) = max{ Π F ( w, r ), Π I ( w, r ) }

Firms with small to medium size have incentives to move between sectors. They will stay
in the formal sector as long as ΠF (.) > ΠI (.), and will stay in the informal sector if ΠF (.)
< ΠI (.).
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The Pension Sector

There are two running pension systems in Indonesia right now. The first type is
the first pillar defined benefit system, but not the pure pay-as-you-go type, as the benefit
is set by the government without any contribution from employees, since the government
fully subsidizes the program (Simanjuntak, 2003). The fund for the subsidy is collected
from central government tax revenue. This type of pension holds only for the civil
servant and the military. The second type is the third pillar voluntary fully funded defined
contribution. Rachmatawarta (2004) stated that there are not many employees involved in
this program. Information regarding the participation rate is unavailable.
In the simulations related to the first research question, the first pillar defined
benefit type is financed by the consumption tax for cash transfers for all pensioners.
Because the cash transfer program is more general and covers all type of workers, the
plan is expected to replace the current defined benefit plan for the civil servants. The
second pillar is a fully funded defined contribution savings plan for workers whose level
of income is sufficient to follow the program.
The households’ total contribution consumption tax for the first pillar defined
benefit is defined as:
(24)

⎫⎪
⎧⎪τ c Ct
for skilled labor at formal sector households
Pt = ⎨
⎬
⎪⎩τ c θ C t for unskilled labor at formal and informal sector households⎪⎭

Again, the variable τc is the consumption tax, the variable θ is the fraction of
consumption of formal sector goods, and the variable Ct is the households’ aggregate
consumption expenditure. Note that even though the contribution is different among
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households, the benefit for any type of household would be the same as it is a lump-sum
benefit.
Meanwhile, the fully funded savings program is defined as:
(25)

Y

T

t =1

t =1

S = ∑ (1 + r ) Y −t H t = ∑

1

(1 + r )t

Bt

The pension savings S equals the total annuities of fully funded savings contribution
during work life Ht , which equals the present value of benefit Bt received when
individuals retire.

The Government Sector

The central government receives taxes from consumption taxes. For Indonesia,
the value added tax is the largest source of revenue of consumption taxes (27 percent of
year 2000 central government revenue), followed by sales taxes (8.6 percent of year 2000
central government revenue). In addition to consumption taxes, capital income taxes in
2000 shared 34 percent of the total disposable capital income. Meanwhile, the tax on
labor is very small, only 1.8 percent of the total disposable labor income. This
demonstrates that the central government is incapable of collecting taxes on labor income.
Given these conditions, the modeling for the government revenue and expenditure
is:
(26)

∞

D(t ) = ∑
t =0

n
n
n
1 ⎡
⎤
c
k
+
+
−
+
+
(
G
T
P
)
(
τ
c
τ
r
a
τ w w F + τ F YF ) ⎥
∑
∑
∑
G
t
t
t ⎢
(1 + r ) ⎣
i =1
i =1
i =1
⎦

Variable D(t) is the government deficit, variable G is the government expenditure, and
variable TG is the government transfer to households. The transfer is in terms of
consumption. The government deficit is financed by increasing the consumption tax, and
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so is equal to zero in each period; that is, in the simulation, the consumption tax balances
the government budget. The Indonesian government bond market has just been developed
in 2005, and so it is not modeled here.

The Foreign Sector

The Indonesian economy imports consumption goods and investment goods from
abroad. The foreign good is assumed to be a perfect substitute for the domestic
commodity. Labor is the only non-traded good.
The trade balance TB is defined as:
TBt = Yt − C t − I t − Gt

(27)

Meanwhile, the foreign debt Bte is connected to the net exports TB through this relation:
∞

Bte = ∑ Rtg TBt

(28)

τ =t

g
t

where R is the trade balance discount factor.

The Competitive Equilibrium

The equilibrium for the economy assumes the following conditions.
The total labor in the economy is comprised of skilled labor in the formal sector
LsF, unskilled labor in the formal sector LuF, and unskilled labor in the informal sector
LuI.

(29)

L = Ls F + Lu F + Lu I

The total capital in the economy is the sum of capital in the formal sector KF and the
informal sector KI , or:
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(30)

K = KF + KI

The initial capital amount for production in the formal production sector is the initial
capital income divided by interest rate and depreciation rate:
(31)

K0 =

1
R0
rF + δ F

Aggregate investment I in the formal sector is defined as an increment to the capital
stock Kt, or
(32)

K t +1 = I t + (1 − δ ) K t

(Recall that capital does not accumulate in the informal sector.) Meanwhile, the clearing
price of capital in both markets is:
(33)

rI = rF + Γ

where Γ is the lending risk in the informal sector.
The next equations are the marginal conditions for prices in the formal sector.
First is the interest rate in the formal sector:
(34)

rF = (1 − τ F ) α Z F K Fα −1 LγsF LωuF − δ F

so that the interest rate, as the price of capital, satisfies the marginal condition for capital
in the formal sector. (Recall that the interest rate in the informal sector is derived from
this via equation (33).) The wage of skilled labor in the formal sector is given by:
(35)

(1 − τ F )
w =
γ Z F K Fα LγsF−1 LωuF
1 − tw
F
s

so that the wage of skilled labor in the formal sector satisfies the marginal condition for
labor in the formal sector, as does unskilled labor in the formal sector according to.
(36)

wuF = (1 − τ F ) ω Z F K Fα LγsF LωuF−1
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Meanwhile, the marginal condition for prices in the informal sector is given as
(37)

rI = α Z I K Iα −1 LωuI − δ I

so that the interest rate, as the price of capital, satisfies the marginal condition for capital
in the informal sector. Finally,
(38)

wuI = ω Z I K Iα LωuI−1

so that the wage of labor in the informal sector satisfies the marginal condition for labor
in the informal sector.
The macroeconomy equilibrium satisfies the fact that Indonesia is a small open
economy country:
(39)

Y = C + I +G+ X −M

Finally, to satisfy the small open economy assumption, the domestic interest rate r adjusts
to the international interest rate re in the long run, so that:
(40)

r = re

Examples of the small open economy dynamic CGE model can be seen at Broer and
Westerhout (1997), and Broer, Westerhout, and Bovenberg (1994).

The Market Clearing Condition

As there are movements of labor between sectors, we may conclude that there is a
market clearing price of labor that adjusts the amount of labor in the two markets. From
equations (33) and (35), we can define the price of unskilled labor wuF in the formal
market as:
(41)

ω
K
w F = F (r + δ ) F
u
F
F L
α
F
UF
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From equations (34) and (35), we can define the price of skilled labor wSF in the formal
market:
(42)

wSF =

γ F (rF + δ F ) K F
α F (1 − t w ) LUF

From equations (33) and (34), the optimal amount of skilled and unskilled labor in the
formal sector is given as:
(43)

wSF γ
1 LUF
=
F
wu ω (1 − t w ) LSF

Finally, from equations (36) and (37), we can define the price of unskilled labor in the
informal sector:
(44)

wuI =

ωI
K
( rI + δ I ) I
αI
LUI

Given the market clearing condition for the unskilled labor in both sectors:
(45)

wUF = wUI

we can write the optimal amount of unskilled labor in both sectors:
(46)

LUF α I ω F (rF + δ F ) K F
=
LUI α F ω I (rI + δ I ) K I

What can we infer from the market clearing condition? First, from equation (43), there is
always a certain ratio between the amount of skilled and unskilled labor in the formal
sector. Second, from equation (46), the ratio of unskilled labor in both sectors is the
function of the ratio of capital in both sectors. The implication is that taxing capital in the
formal sector would induce the movement of capital to the informal sector, and also
would alter the ratio of unskilled labor in both sectors.

57

The Simulation

After the calibration of the model above, there are two simulations that are done.
The first simulation is the increase of consumption taxes as a source of finance for a
defined benefit pension program for retirees. The purpose of this program is to provide a
minimum physical need for all pensioners. The second simulation is the extension of a
mandatory fully funded system that links the contribution and the benefit, thereby serving
as the savings purpose of the pension program. The purpose of the two simulations is to
look at the impact of taxation on the amount of labor in the both the formal and informal
sectors, and the possibility of the extension of the formal sector through the extension of
the fully funded pension program. As labor is able to move from the formal sector to the
informal sector and vice versa, the consumption taxes may at some rate drive the
movement of labor from the informal sector to the formal one, as the taxation changes the
value function of consumption, leisure, and income.
For the first simulation with the defined benefit program, I choose the tax on
consumption since there is no link between the benefit received and the amount of tax
paid. This is one way to cut the link between the benefit received and the amount of tax
paid that exists in the payroll taxes. Theoretically, for a defined benefit program, the
government should not charge a pension tax from employers, as this increases the burden
on enterprises in term of an increase in the cost of production, or it induces employers
either to move to the informal sector or to cut-off the amount of hired employees, as
happened in Brazil (Filho, 2005), China (Yuan and Feng, 2004), and Turkey (Brook and
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Whitehouse, 2006). 2 The government also should not charge the tax on wages of the
formal workers to finance the first pillar mandatory defined benefit pension plan, as this
induces workers to move to the informal sector. This also happened in Brazil.
Another theoretical reason for choosing the consumption tax: it is the only tax
variable that does not link to the tax of capital and labor, as shown in equation (25) on the
government revenue. The tax on capital reduces the usage of capital; the tax on labor
income reduces the labor supply, while the tax on corporate income reduces both labor
and capital. All of the three taxes, on capital, on labor, and on corporate income, mostly
take place in the formal sector. Therefore, increasing one of the taxes creates an incentive
for labor and firms to move to informal sector. The tax on consumption holds generally
for labor in the formal and informal sector so that there is little incentive for intersectoral
movement, as long as the tax rate is bearable for taxpayers. Valverde (2006) also suggests
the use of consumption tax financing for pension plans in countries with a large informal
labor market.
The second simulation is the implementation of a mandatory fully funded pension
program. In the simulation, even though the program holds for the total workers in the
formal sector, both skilled and unskilled, I assume that not many unskilled laborers
follow the program as their labor income is not sufficient if they have to pay the fully
funded program on their own. The rate of participation is set at 10 percent of the wages of
skilled labor. The justification for the 10 percent rate is that Law No. 11/1969 regarding
the pension for civil servants stated that the contribution from employees is 4.75 percent.

2

For information, Turkey is a member of OECD countries who runs a three-party pension system with
formal and informal production and labor markets.
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I round up the contribution to 5 percent, and assume that the government or the
employers match another 5 percent of contribution.

60

CHAPTER FIVE
The Program and Data

This chapter elaborates on the computer program used to solve the OLG-CGE
model and the data used to solve the model. The organization of this chapter is as follows.
I first discuss the computer program used to find solutions for the OLG-CGE model.
After that, I discuss the data used for the model. There are three important classifications
of data. The first is macroeconomy data, the second is microeconomic data on
consumption, leisure, and interest rates, and the third category is data on population and
labor markets, including the productivity of labor. Data in all classes are related to
Indonesia, unless specified as US data for the purpose of comparison.

The Program

To understand how data are chosen, it is important first to understand how the
program works. The program for overlapping generation computable general equilibrium
(OLG-CGE) model follows the one written by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Before the
year 2001, this program was written in the FORTRAN computer language. Starting in
the year 2001, through the generosity of Professor Thomas Rutherford (Rasmussen and
Rutherford, 2004), scholars who work on OLG modeling are able to write the program in
GAMS language. 3

3

Having written the mathematical OLG model in paper term, I corresponded by e-mail with Professor
Laurence J. Kotlikoff from Boston University and Professor De Peter Broer from Tilburg University,
Netherlands, at the end of year 2005. Each person stated that they still write the OLG model in FORTRAN
computer language. Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004) state that their paper is the first “how to”
introduction to overlapping generations modeling. In the paper, they use GAMS instead of FORTRAN. I
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The OLG-CGE model is a standard theoretical mathematical model (e.g., CES
intertemporal utility function between consumption and leisure, the theorem of steadystate, the Keynesian aggregate saving-investment balance). Transferring the model from
paper to computer does not much change the language. The syntax program for the OLG
model in the computer is also a theoretical mathematical one. One of the characteristics
of the theoretical model is its generality, valid for every economic structure. The
implication is that, applying the model from one economy to another needs only change
the data without changing the program, assuming the programmer has the same purpose
for the model application.
There are three types of basic OLG-CGE modeling. The first and the simplest one
is the OLG Exchange model. A second and more complex one is the OLG Bequest model.
The third type of model, and the one that I apply here, is the OLG Production model. The
three OLG models could be mixed one into another according to necessity. For
elaboration of each model, see Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004).
The fundamental of the mathematical OLG program is the intertemporal
macroeconomy model. In the model, the variables consumption, leisure, and interest rates
play an essential role. Consumption and leisure generate the intertemporal utility function
of the individuals in the model. The interest rate functions as the relative price of present
and future consumption. Since the OLG model is a dynamic one, there is also the
variable time in the model. Time is set annually and separated into consumption and
leisure. In addition, variable assets are included as an exchange for consumption before

myself find that writing the OLG-CGE model in GAMS program is much more user friendly than writing it
in FORTRAN.
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the individual is working, and therefore one is able to consume from the beginning of
one’s time at age 21, after one’s retirement at age 55, and to the end of time at age 65.
The basic OLG production model has five steps in the construction of model
blocks. The first step is the set building for generation indexes, time periods, and lifecycle. The second step consists of the construction of the benchmark steady-state of
reference generation. The replication of the second step for every generation by mapping
each variable to every generation follows in the third step. After that, the redistribution of
assets as a benchmark of assets holding is completed in the fourth step. Finally, the fifth
step consists of the building of the macroeconomy block. A calibration procedure is
processed after each step is completed. The GAMS program applies the Newton iteration
method for calibration.

Data for the Production Model

The starting point for the development of any CGE model, either static or
dynamic, is the construction of a macroeconomic but microeconomic-consistent
benchmark data set. Since the pioneering work of Pyatt and Thorbecke, the benchmark
dataset for a CGE model is specified in the form of social accounting matrix (Davies,
2004).
Data for the OLG-CGE Production model comprise benchmark macroeconomy
data, the population set, fundamental parameters, the productivity index, and a labor
condition. Below is the elaboration for each category. All data are set starting from year
2000 because this is the year for the latest data released of the Indonesia social
accounting matrix. I also set year 2000 as the benchmark time for all benchmark data

63

collected. The consequence is the initial steady-state condition in the model starts from
the year 2000.

The Benchmark Macroeconomy Data

The Indonesian open macroeconomy data for year 2000 can be seen at Table 6.

Table 6. Indonesia: The Summary of Year 2000 Macroeconomy Outlook
(Trillion Rupiah)
Output
Income
Expenditure
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2

3

4

5
937.5

6
233.7

7
115.7

8
569.5

72.6
7.2

(81.2)

195.5

488.3

725.9
642.2
184.2
541.7

11.3
630.9
307.7
195.5

488.3

Total 1,856.4

725.9

642.2

195.5

1,245.2

233.7

Total
1,856.4
725.9
642.2
195.5
1,245.2
233.7
195.5
488.3
5,582.7

Notes: 1 = Output, 2 = Value Added on Capital, 3 = Value Added on Labor, 4 = Tax Revenue,
5 = Private Consumption, 6 = Investment, 7 = Government Expenditure, 8 = Rest of the World
Source: "Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia 2000" (2003), modified by Widjaja.

Here are the lists of benchmark macroeconomy data for Indonesian economy, taken from
the macroeconomy data in Table 5.1. The matrix itself is the summary of Indonesian year
2000 social accounting matrix. 4 Later on, the figures will be replicated and developed in
the CGE model through generations. Figures are in year 2000 rupiah trillion, except for
the benchmark tax rates.
C0
I0
G0
X0
4

benchmark private consumption
benchmark investment
benchmark government consumption
benchmark exports

937.5
233.7
115.7
569.5

The actual Y2000 Indonesia social accounting matrix comprises of three size categories. The largest one
is 110 rows * 110 columns. The medium size is 38 rows * 38 columns. The smallest one is 13 rows * 13
columns. The matrix in this paper is summarized from the smallest social accounting matrix.
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M0
R0
L0
S0
T0
D0
B0
Y0
K0
TR0
TL0

benchmark imports
benchmark capital earnings (net of tax)
benchmark labor earning (net of tax)
benchmark savings
benchmark government transfers to households
benchmark government budget deficit
benchmark trade deficit
benchmark output
benchmark capital stock
benchmark tax rate on capital income
benchmark tax rate on labor income

488.3
541.7
630.9
307.7
72.6
- 7.2
- 81.2
1,368.1
864.0
0.34
0.018

Benchmark output Y0, Rp.1,368.1 trillion, is the sum of value added on capital (Rp.
725.9 trillion) and value added on labor (Rp. 642.2 trillion). The figure is then broken
down into the tax on capital (Rp. 184.2 trillion), the benchmark capital earnings R0 (Rp.
541,7 trillion), the tax on labor (Rp. 11.3 trillion), and the benchmark labor earnings L0
(Rp. 630.9 trillion).
The sum of the tax on capital and the tax on labor equals the government tax
revenue (Rp. 195.5 trillion). This figure, after distributed into government consumption
G0 (Rp. 115.7 trillion) and government transfers T0 (Rp. 72.6 trillion), becomes
government budget surplus or negative government deficit D0 (Rp. 7.2 trillion).
The benchmark government consumption G0 (Rp. 115.7 trillion) is the sum of
government expenditures, and consists of four items. Those items are intra-government
transfers, government expenditure on domestic goods, government expenditure on
imported goods, and interest payments on foreign loan (not shown in the matrix).
The benchmark private consumption C0 (Rp. 937.5 trillion) is the total household
expenditures, comprising four items: transfers among households, household expenditure
on domestic goods, household expenditure on imported goods, and household transfers
abroad (not shown in the matrix).
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The counterpart of the benchmark consumption is the benchmark savings S0 (Rp.
307.7 trillion), which is the sum of take home labor earnings (Rp. 541.7 trillion), take
home capital earnings (Rp. 630.9 trillion), and government transfers to households T0
(Rp. 72.6 trillion), subtracted by benchmark private consumption C0 (Rp. 937.5 trillion).
For the open economy data, the benchmark trade deficit B0 is negative, or Rp.
81.2 trillion in year 2000, as the value of exports X0 (Rp. 569.5 trillion) is larger than
imports M0 (Rp. 488.3 trillion). Indonesia experienced a surplus in its current account in
that year.
For domestic data, benchmark investment I0 (Rp. 214.1 trillion) is equal to the
sum of benchmark savings S0 and the government budget deficit D0. Links among the
three variables satisfy the savings-investment balance relationship.
Another important variable is the benchmark capital stock K0. For a developing
country like Indonesia, some economic data do not exist. The data on the capital stock is
no exception. Some researchers from the Bank of Indonesia, the Indonesian Central Bank,
have tried to estimate the capital stock for Indonesia. Wicaksono, Ariantoro, and Sari
(2002) estimated the capital stock of Indonesia by using a perpetual inventory method
and comparing the gross estimation result with the net one. The result of their simulation
is in Table 7.

Table 7. Indonesia: The Estimation of the Capital Stock (Year 2000, Trillion Rupiah)
Gross Capital Stock
Net Capital Stock
Australian Method
Netherlands Method
(Discard Function)
(Survival Function)
1,939.8
1,236.5
1,336.9
Source: Wicaksono, Ariantoro, and Sari (2002)
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Still, the estimation result in Table 7 is under debate. 5
I follow the Auerbach and Kotlikoff calculation method. Their calculation method
is that the benchmark capital stock K0 is equal to the ratio of benchmark capital earnings
divided by the sum of the periodic interest rate and the periodic depreciation rate. The
result for K0 is Rp. 864 trillion.
Still following Auerbach and Kotlikoff, the data for the benchmark tax rate on
capital income TR0 is set from the tax effort data (e.g., the ratio of tax revenue over the
tax base) on capital. The figure reached as high as 34 percent (or 184.2/541.7) in year
2000. Similarly, the benchmark tax rate on labor income TL0 is the tax effort on labor,
and is low, only 1.8 percent. These calculations show that there is a lot more effort to be
done to increase the tax revenue from labor income, including the pension tax. At the end
of Chapter Five, I elaborate benchmark labor data, to get a better picture for why the tax
effort on labor income in Indonesia is so low.

The Population Set

The population set comprises time interval, life cycle, and generation. The time
interval is set at a 5-year cycle for each period in order to catch the long run impact of
pension policy without having too many unimportant details. Again, year 0 in the model
is year 2000. The “existence” of people in the model begins at age 21 where people enter
the labor market. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
the life expectancy for Indonesia reached age 65.6 in year 2000. Therefore, in order to
construct the model close to the factual, the life cycle is set from 0 to 40, meaning that
5

There is also a work in progress by Van der Eng (n.d.) from Australia National University on the
estimation of the Indonesia capital stock. Unfortunately, the Van der Eng requested that the paper not be
quoted, as it is not finished yet.
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people “die” at age 65. The calculation of the maximum age in the model is the initial age
(20) plus the maximum amount of age point in the life-cycle (9) multiplied by the time
interval (5). Currently, pensions for civil servants start at age 56 in Indonesia. The time
period is set from year 0 to year 120.
Generation is set from the initial year for the oldest generation born at age (-40),
to the end of the observed time period at time 120. Therefore, there are four generations
in the model, starting from time (-40) to time 0, from time 0 to time 40, from time 40 to
time 80, and from time 80 to time 120.

The Fundamental Parameters 6

There are eight required fundamental parameters, and the way each datum is
collected is different one from another. The data comprise the annual interest rate, the
annual population growth rate, the annual depreciation rate, the intertemporal elasticity,
the elasticity of substitution between consumption versus leisure, the consumption share
parameters, the elasticity of transformation between domestic goods versus exports, and
the Armington elasticity. The next paragraphs discuss how these parameters are chosen.
Annual interest rate. The annual real interest rate is calculated at 7 percent for Indonesia.

The value is 5 percent for US case. The formula for the real interest rate is
(30)

ra = (1- τ) i - πc

where ra = real interest rate
τ = consumption tax rate, set at 10 percent

6

Fundamental parameters are required parameters in order for the OLG-CGE simultaneous equation
system to work well. See Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004) for more information.
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i = nominal interest rate for consumption credit (20 percent in Y 2000)

πc = inflation rate at the food sector (11 percent in Y 2000).
Source: "Indonesian Financial Statistics" (various)

The annual interest rate is developed as the periodic interest rate by the following formula:
(31)

r = (1+ ra) T -1

where r = periodic interest rate
T = time interval.
Population growth rate. Data for the Indonesian annual population growth rate is taken

from the United Nations population projection. The year 2000 annual population growth
rate is 1.26 percent. See Table 8.

Table 8. Indonesia: The Annual Periodic Population Growth Rate (percent)
20002005

20052010

20102015

20152020

20202025

1.37

1.30

1.21

1.09

0.94

Source: Population projection 2000-2050

I calculate the periodic population growth rate γ by the following formula:
(32)

γ = (1+ 0.01) T -1

Rasmussen and Rutherford set the US annual population growth rate at 1 percent. They
do not set the aging phenomenon into the model.

Annual depreciation rate. The macroeconomy data for the annual depreciation rate of

capital are shown in Table 9, where I present the Indonesian macroeconomy annual
depreciation rate.
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Table 9. Indonesia: The Annual Macroeconomy Depreciation Rate
Year

(a)
Depreciation
(Current Prices,
Trillion Rp)

(b)
(a/b)
GDP
Average
(Current
Depreciation
Prices,
Rate
Trillion Rp)
(percent)
1990
9.8
195. 6
5.0
1991
11.4
227. 4
5.0
1992
13. 0
259. 9
5.0
1993
16. 5
329. 8
5.0
1994
19. 1
382. 2
5.0
1995
22. 7
454. 5
5.0
1996
26. 6
532. 6
5.0
1997
31. 4
627. 7
5.0
1998
47. 8
955. 7
5.0
1999
55. 0
1 099. 7
5.0
2000
63. 2
1 264. 9
5.0
2001
73. 4
1 467. 6
5.0
2002
80. 9
1 619. 1
5.0
Source: "Statistik Enam Puluh Tahun Indonesia Merdeka"

These data are calculated as a comparison for the annual depreciation rate of capital in
the model. The actual annual depreciation rate for Indonesia is 5 percent on average.
Given the (initial) steady state condition 7
(33)

R r +δ
=
I γ +δ

together with the assumptions that r = 0.07, γ = 0.01, δ = 0.05, the benchmark
macroeconomy data above, the ratio of the after-tax capital earning R to investment level
I equal to 2.0, then in order to fit the steady-state condition, the actual value of
investment level I must be modified. This annual depreciation rate itself is then
developed into periodic depreciation rate by the following formula:
(34)

7

δ = 1 – (1- δa ) T

Please see Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004) for derivation of the formula
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where δa,and δ is the annual and periodic depreciation rates, respectively.
For the US case, Rasmussen and Rutherford set first the value of r, γ, and δ. The
value of δ was set at 7 percent. After that, they modified the value of investment I to fit
the steady-state condition.

Inverse intertemporal elasticity. There are no available data for the Indonesia inverse

inter-temporal elasticity. I try to find the value by doing some econometric estimation,
following the work of Mankiw (1985) for US data. Auerbach and Kotlikoff put the values
of the intertemporal elasticity estimated from the work of Mankiw. The figure ranges
from -0.23 to -0.37. They chose 0.25 as the intertemporal elasticity value, with an implied
inverse of 4.
My econometric work used the OLS method, and finds the value of alpha, the
inter-temporal elasticity as -0.1881 (Table 10). This means that the inverse inter-temporal
elasticity (1/alpha) for Indonesia reached 5.3 for the upper benchmark figure. The OLS
model specification is shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Indonesia: The OLS Estimation of Intertemporal Elasticity
Year 1983-2004

(35)

log(C t +1 / C t ) = a0 + 1 / α log( RC ,t +1 ) + η C ,t +1

where:
log(C t +1 / C t ) = the growth rate of annual consumption
RC = 1 + (1 − τ )i − π C = one plus the after-tax real interest rate measured in terms of nondurable goods, which is the relative price of consumption today
versus consumption tomorrow.
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a0
1/ α

Coeficient
0.4365

t-stat
6.685

Prob-t
0.000

-0.1881

-5.763

0.000

F( 1, 20) = 33.21
Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared
= 0.6241
Adj R-squared = 0.6053

Source : Widjaja’s STATA estimation

The model equation is actually the Euler condition of the relative price of the current and
future consumption, derived from the log utility of intertemporal consumption function
Mankiw (1985). The relative price is the after tax real interest rate. The data for the
annual growth rate of consumption are calculated from the annual data of macroeconomy
aggregate consumption, issued by the Central Board of Statistics, while the data for the
interest rate are the ones issued by Bank Indonesia.
The estimation result shows an R-squared 0.6241, meaning that the model does
not perfectly explain the movement of inter-temporal consumption function. Still, the
estimation of the explanatory variables shows a good result. The t-statistic for 1/α is 5.763 with probability 0.000, which suggests that the after tax real interest rate as a
relative price is a good explanatory variable. Starting from the upper benchmark value
5.3, I put the value one by one (5.3, 5.2, 5.1, 5.0, 4.9, etc.), and get the optimal value for
Indonesia at 4.0.
Elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of substitution (σ) between consumption versus

leisure ranges from 0.1 to 1. The value for the US case is chosen at 0.8. The elasticity is
useful to find the CES power between consumption function and leisure (ρ). I put the
values into the model one by one (0.8, 0.7, 0.6, etc.), and find that 0.4 is the optimal value
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for the Indonesia elasticity of substitution. The relationship between the two variables is
defined as:
(36)

ρ = 1- 1/ σ

Consumption share parameter. Auerbach and Kotlikoff set the value 0.4 for the US

consumption share parameter. They assumed that people work 2000 hours a year (40
hours per week) from 5000 hours available per year. It is assumed that the income from
total working hours multiplied by wages equal consumption. For the case of Indonesia, I
chose the consumption share parameter around the value of 0.4.

Elasticity of transformation. The elasticity of transformation of resources between

domestic versus exports is taken from the work of Robinson, Said, and San (1997). By
using a static CGE model, they try to observe the impact of the economic crisis on the
Indonesian rice market. They calculated that for the case of Indonesia, the elasticity of
transformation ranges from 0.5 to 2.0, depending on the economic sector. I set the figure
at 1.2 from the value of the agricultural sector elasticity of transformation that dominates
the Indonesian economy. For the US case, the value is chosen at 4.0.
Armington elasticity. The Armington elasticity parameter measures the effect of the

changes of landed (tariff inclusive) prices of imported goods on the price of the same
domestically produced goods (Warr, forthcoming). Leith, Porter, and Warr (2003), by
using a static CGE model in the work on Indonesian rice commodity and tariff, estimated
that the Armington elasticity on imports for Indonesia ranges from 2.0 to 10.0. I choose
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the lowest figure since that is the value that fits the Indonesian model. For the US case,
the chosen value is 4.0.

The Benchmark Labor Data

The labor data are taken from the Statistics of Labor Force in Indonesia, published
by the Indonesian Central Board of Statistics. The summary for Indonesia labor force
condition is presented in Table 11. In total, there are 90.79 million people in the
Indonesian labor force. This amount is around 44 percent of the total Indonesian
population in year 2000 (205.8 million people).

Table 11. Indonesia: The Composition of Labor Force
(Year 2000, Million People)
Skilled

Unskilled

Total

Absolute

3.46

28.21

31.67

(Percent)

(3.9)

(31.1)

(35.0)

Absolute

0.52

58.60

59.12

(Percent)

(0.5)

(64.5)

(65.0)

Absolute

3.98

86.81

90.79

Formal

Informal

Total
(4.4)
(95.6)
(100)
(Percent)
Source: "Laborer/Employees Situation in Indonesia" (various)

The composition of the Indonesian labor force is as follows: there are 3.98 million
people of skilled labor (4.4 percent of total labor in Indonesia) and 86.81 million people
of unskilled labor (95.6 percent of total labor). I define skilled labor as people in the
working force who finished their college and university education. Unskilled labor is
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defined as people in the working force who finished only their high school education or
lower.
Most of skilled labor is able to work in the formal sector, or 3.46 million people.
In total there are 31.67 million people in the formal sector, or 35 percent of total labor.
The other 65.0 percent or 59.12 million people work in the informal sector. I define
formal production sector as employers who employ paid labor and employees who work
as paid labor. Informal production sector is defined as the self-employed, as employers
who employ unpaid labor, and as employees who work as unpaid labor. The definition of
paid and unpaid is whether there exists a contract between employers and employees.
Table 11 also indicates that there are 0.52 million people of skilled labor in the informal
sector. In the model construction in Chapter Four, I ignore the role of skilled labor in the
informal sector because the portion is small, only 0.5 percent of total Indonesian labor.
From the Book of Year 2000 Indonesia Social Accounting Matrix, the average
amount of wages and salary reached Rp 9.9 million in the formal sector and Rp. 4.6
million in the informal sector. From that information, I calculate the ratio of wages and
salary between formal and informal sector as 2.2:1. In terms of the time efficiency
amount, the average labor wages and salary in year 2000 reached Rp. 8.9 million in the
formal sector and Rp. 4.9 million in the informal sector. The ratio between the two was
1.8:1. However, from the calibration result, the ratio between the two cannot be inferred
since the results for both prices of labor start from 100 percent and then decline at the
same rate. 8

8

This is an example of one of the features of using the CGE model. The model is very rigid in the
presentation of results and the growth of variables, following the parameter set-up in the model.
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In Table 12, I do an econometric estimation to observe the relation between
skilled labor and government expenditure, following the work of Verbina and Cowdhury
(2002). It is assume that the annual amount of college and university students is a
function of the population, the income of the family (measured here by GDP per capita),
and the government education expenditure.

Table 12. Indonesia: The OLS Estimation of Elasticity of Government Education
Expenditure to Skilled Labor Creation 1983-2004

(37)

ln y t = β1 ln x1t + β 2 ln x 2t + β 3 ln x3t + ε t

where:
ln y t = the logarithm of the annual amount of college and university student
ln x1t = the logarithm of annual government education expenditure (billion Rp.)
ln x 2t = the logarithm of annual number of population
ln x3t = the logarithm of annual GDP per capita
Coefficient
β1
0.296
β2
0.987
β3
0.166
F( 3, 19) = 82444.53
Prob > F = 0.0000

t-stat
Prob-t
3.40
0.003
18.92
0.000
2.27
0.035
R-squared
= 0.9999
Adj R-squared = 0.9999

Source: Widjaja’s STATA estimation

In Table 12, I estimate that the elasticity of government budget of skilled labor creation
reached 0.296. This means that for every 100 percent increase of government expenditure
on education, there is a 29.6 percent increase of college and university students generated
from the government education expenditure.
The high value of the R-squared (0.99) shows that the model is a good one to
explain the dependent variable. Also, the t-statistics for each independent variable are
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very significant. The t-statistic for government expenditure is 3.40 with probability 0.003,
the t-statistic for population is 18.92 with probability 0.000, and the t-statistic for GDP
per capita is 2.27 with probability 0.035.

The Productivity Index

The final estimation is for the productivity index. The model is the same as the
one used in Auerbach and Kotlikoff, who followed the estimation obtained by Welch
(1979). The estimation model is in Table 13.

Table 13. Indonesia: The OLS Estimation of the Labor Productivity Index
(Year 2000 Cross-Section Raw Data)

(38)

ln y i = α + β1 x1i + β 2 x12i + γ hi + δ t + ε i

where:
ln y i = the logarithm of weekly labor earnings of full-time workers
x1i = experience
x1i2
hi
t

= squared of experience
= weekly working hours
= time trend

Coeficient
Α
8.4493
β1
0.1128
β2
- 0.0012
Γ
0.0305
Δ
0.2177
F( 4,114676) = 21735.35
Prob > F
= 0.0000

t-stat
391.024
106.697
-90.750
118.282
219.224
r-squared
= 0.4312
Adj r-squared = 0.4312

Prob-t
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Source : Widjaja’s STATA estimation

The low r-squared value 0.4312 indicates that the model of Indonesian labor productivity
index above is not a strong one. However, the two important parameters, β1 and β2 , are
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good estimators for the experience variables. Their t-statistic are high, and their
probability is 0.000.
The productivity index equation can then be written as:
(39)

PI(A) = Exp( 8.4493 + 0.1128*Age(A) - 0.0012*(Age(A)**2) / Exp(8.4493)

where
PI = Productivity Index
A

= Age

Exp = Exponential anti-log function
The productivity index measures the productivity of labor according to age and wages.
Again, it is a linear combination between skilled and unskilled labor in the formal sector
only. Wages become the measure of productivity here, and are treated as the dependent
variable. Readers may see that the productivity index is positively related to age, A, but
negatively related to the square of age, A2, which means that the production capacity of
laborers increases at the beginning and reaches its peak at certain age (age 47) before
going down until they retire.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Analysis of Sources of Financing

This chapter covers the analysis of ways the Indonesian government finances the
pension program. As has been noted in Chapter Three, the program is a program that
combines redistribution via a defined benefit type and a fully-funded defined contribution
type. The redistribution program is intended to eliminate poverty among older people as
well as to create an incentive for young individuals to save for their own future in the
fully funded program. In this case, the redistribution program is financed through
government budget. The savings purpose of the fully funded program may be financed
by the individuals and by the institution where they work. In this chapter, I analyze how
the Indonesian government should finance these programs.

Redistribution program. For the distribution program, there are three options of

financing source to be made. Those options are to fund from corporate income taxes,
from labor income taxes, and from consumption taxes. Based on several criteria, such as
easiness to administer, sufficiency, sustainability, and excess burden, the choice falls on
consumption taxes.
The government has two alternatives regarding the time of transferring the
redistribution program. Those disbursement times are ex-ante retirement and ex-post
retirement (Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes, 1998). In the ex-ante retirement
alternative, the government puts the funds in the worker’s account every month during
the working time of the worker. In term of incentives, ex-ante financing is preferable for
workers. The ex-post retirement financing means that the government disburses the fund
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to the retiree after they are retired. In terms of budget feasibility for the government, expost disbursement is preferable to ex-ante retirement. In doing the analysis, I assume that
the Indonesian government chooses ex-post disbursement 9 The benefits for every
pensioner are set equal across pensioners irrespective of how much they have contributed
through the consumption tax. This type of benefit is known as a flat benefit.

Fully funded program. The fully funded program is the actual pension program that I

examine for the long run of the model. I expect that, as labor becomes more educated, the
wages of labor become sufficiently high that laborers are able to self-finance their own
pension. As more people get involved in the fully funded savings program, the central
government is able to release the burden of cash transfers for minimum pension. For the
fully funded savings pension program, since it has a strong connection between
contributions and benefits, the financing is taken from the earmarked taxes on labor
income. The benefit received from this program depends on the contribution of each
person into their pension account.

The Financing of the Redistribution Program

The redistribution program is financed from the three sources of tax choices:
corporate income taxes, labor income taxes, and consumption taxes. Included in the
consumption tax is a value added tax, an excise tax, and a tax on luxurious goods. Since
this is a redistribution defined benefit program, the source of financing does not have to

9

Actually, if the government does not allow the retiree to disburse the pension fund before they retire, the
ex-ante financing system can be transferred to the ex-post financing system.
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be taxed from earmarked taxes, i.e., labor income. Before we proceed, let us see the
pension necessity of retirees (Table 14).

Table 14. Indonesia: The Redistribution Financing Need Year 2000-2050
Population
Year
Amount
Annual Benefit Provision (billion Rp)
Age 60+
(million people)

World Bank Poverty Measures
USD 1/day

USD 2/day

USD 3/day

Indonesia Poverty Lines
At
At
At
50 percent
100 percent
150 percent

2000
16.2
58.3
116.6
175.0
9.7
19.4
29.2
2005
18.6
67.0
133.9
200.9
16.7
33.5
50.2
2010
20.9
75.2
150.5
225.7
25.1
50.2
75.2
2015
24.4
87.8
175.7
263.5
36.6
73.2
109.8
2020
29.2
105.1
210.2
315.4
52.6
105.1
157.7
2025
34.6
124.6
249.1
373.7
72.7
145.3
218.0
2030
41.3
148.7
297.4
446.0
99.1
198.2
297.4
2035
48.3
173.9
347.8
521.6
130.4
260.8
391.2
2040
55.5
199.8
399.6
599.4
166.5
333.0
499.5
2045
62.2
223.9
447.8
671.8
205.3
410.5
615.8
2050
67.4
242.6
485.3
727.9
242.6
485.3
727.9
Source: a. "World population prospects: The 2006 revision population database
b. Maksum (n.d.)
Note: It is assumed that USD 1 = Rp. 10.000.
According to Central of Board Statistics calculation, the poverty lines increases by Rp 50.000 for
every 5 years in 1999-2004, and this amount becomes the basis for inflation adjustment
calculation in the table above.

Table 14 shows two alternative ways of calculating annual benefit provision for
the cash transfer program. The first one is calculated from the World Bank’s
measurement of poverty, and the second one is calculated from the Indonesian Central
Board of Statistics poverty line. The benefit calculation according to the Indonesian
poverty line is low at the beginning, and the amount is lower than the benefit calculation
from the World Bank’s poverty measures. Later on, the benefit calculation according to
Indonesian poverty lines increases gradually as the amount is adjusted to the inflation rate
at Rp. 10.000 annually, or USD 1 per year.
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The World Bank’s measures of poverty are based on the daily income level, and
the minimum amount at this time is USD 1 per day. I offer three alternative levels of
benefit provision. In Table 6.1, the benefit USD 3 per day is the highest benefit that
satisfies personal daily physical need. The amount USD 2 per day provides a minimum
personal benefit, while USD 1 per day is below the necessity. Still, the benefit USD 1 per
day is acceptable as part of the benefit since this benefit supports the benefit received
from the fully funded system. Unlike the benefit calculation based on the Indonesian
poverty line, the benefit calculation is kept constant for the whole year. For the first year,
the amount provided to support USD 1 per day person is Rp 58.3 billion. This is the
lowest amount for the first year according to the World Bank measures. However, this
amount is still higher than the highest figure according to the poverty line measurement
of the Indonesian Central Board of Statistics. For the source of financing, the choice of
tax base is listed in Table 15. The amount is matched to the necessity from the first year.

Table 15. Indonesia: The Redistribution Financing Need Year 2000 (billion Rp.)
% from the
Tax Base
Base amount Current tax % from the
CTR +
base
revenue
base
minimum
(CTR)
social security
amount
Corporate
391.1
184.2
47.1
242.5
61.9
Income
Labor Income
641.8
11.4
1.8
69.7
10.8
Consumption
937.5
69.9
7.5
128.2
13.7
Taxes
Source: "Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia 2000," 2003, calculated by Widjaja.

Again, there are three choices of the source of financing for social security
redistribution purpose: corporate income, labor income, and consumption taxes. For
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simulation purposes, the minimum amount of the social security benefit is added on top
of the taxed amount.
Corporate income is the current most accessible source of taxes for the central
government. The problem is that the current tax amount is already quite high, or 47
percent of the tax base. Adding the social security taxes on top of that creates a very high
tax burden for firms in the private sector, and many firms might leave from the business
sector or move to the informal business sector. Sustainability of social security taxes from
this source is also not certain.
Labor income is the most difficult tax source for the central government to access.
From the year 2000 social accounting matrix, the tax effort from labor income reached
only 1.8 percent, less than 2 percent (Table 15). From the labor data in Chapter Five,
roughly 65 percent of Indonesian laborers work in the informal sector, a sector that is
largely excluded from government taxes. We also know that the informal goods sector is
predicted to contribute to Indonesian GDP by 25 percent (Charmes, 2000). If the
prediction regarding the GDP share of formal and informal sector is true, then the social
security benefit would be sustainable if the government wa able to increase the base up to
70 percent of the total labor income. Adding the social security tax on top of year 2000
labor income tax increases the total tax effort into 10.8 percent.
However, there are problems with labor income taxation for redistribution. As the
benefit may be relatively lower than the contributions, workers may want to move from
the formal sector to the informal sector to avoid the taxes. As has already been discussed
in the model construction in Chapter Four, the increase of wage taxes may reduce the
value function of workers in the formal sector. If workers think that their value function
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in the formal sector becomes lower than their value function in the informal sector, then
they will move to the informal sector. The second problem with this tax source is that
many workers’ monthly salaries are too low, only sufficient to satisfy their physical needs
without an additional premium to pay the taxes. The third problem arising from taxing
labor income is that self-employed workers tend not to pay the additional social security
taxes, as happened in the application of pay-as-you-go system in both the developed and
developing countries applying the system.
The last source of taxes is consumption taxes. While the tax effort is fairly high,
amounting to 7.5 percent of the consumption base, there are still some parts of the
consumption base that fall in the informal goods production sector. It is not known how
large is the consumption share of goods produced by the informal sector firms. Using
Charmes (2000) prediction, I assume that the consumption of the goods produced in the
formal sector reaches 75 percent of the Indonesian total consumption. This explains why
the consumption tax base can still be increased. Adding the social security tax into the
current tax revenue increases the tax effort into 13.7 percent. From the tax base amount,
consumption taxes are predicted also as a sustainable source for the social security taxes
and a relatively easy source of taxes to administer. Last, consumption taxes as the source
of redistribution for social security have its own merit as a growth multiplier. The tax
amount distributed to the retirees is partially being consumed directly, returning some
part of the taxes to the economy. In turn, this multiplier effect will slightly decrease the
tax effort ratio as the total amount of indirect tax base (in terms of consumption)
increases.
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Having reviewed all of the choices above, I conclude that consumption tax is the
best choice among the three to be chosen as the tax base to serve the redistribution
purpose of the social security program.

The Financing of the Savings Program

Since the savings program has a strong link between benefits and contributions,
tax financing should be applicable on the labor income tax base. Therefore, the
candidates for tax base are the corporate income and the labor income. The policy
choices are either that the government charges 100 percent taxes on labor income or that
is uses some combination of corporate income and labor income (50-50 percent) taxes. I
assume the amount is 10 percent of the labor income. As has already been stated in
Chapter Four, the amount of 10 percent is based on Law No. 11/1969 regarding the
pension of civil servants. The Law states that civil servants pay 4.75 percent of their
salary for the pension savings. I round up of this share to 5 percent, and then assume that
the company or the central government matches the same amount of the 5 percent tax to
the individual’s pension account. From the social accounting matrix, it can be calculated
that the average monthly labor income of skilled labor is Rp. 5 million. Ten percent of the
income amount is Rp 500 thousand and 5 percent is Rp 250 thousand, which are then
assumed to be affordable for a skilled labor in Indonesia; that is, saving Rp. 500 thousand
monthly for 35 years will be sufficient for one person to have a decent living when retire.
As I already have reviewed, there are some advantages and disadvantages for
each type of taxes. Due to a strong link between benefits and contributions for a fully
funded savings pension program, I expect that there will be little movement of labor from
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the formal sector to the informal sector after labor income taxation, especially for labor
whose wages are at the margin between the two sectors. The detailed analysis is shown in
Chapter Eight.

The Redistribution Issue

In the pay-as-you-go mandatory pension system, the redistribution of assets
across cohorts (intergenerational redistribution) and the redistribution of assets within
cohorts (intragenerational redistribution) takes place as the benefits are received and the
taxes are paid by different individuals in different generations. As a consequence, the
present value of the amount of taxes paid and the amount of benefits received will be
different. The current tax rate and the future tax rate may or may not be the same. In
order to calculate the intragenerational redistribution as well as the intergenerational
redistribution, the pension taxes should be the type of earmarked taxes, i.e., taxes and
transfer payments that can be traced to the individual.
This is, however, not the case for a fully funded mandatory system. In such a
pension system, the pension is paid by taxpayers for themselves in the future, and the
present value of taxes and benefits received will only differ if the rate of return on
investment of the fund received from taxes is differ from the annual discount rate (i.e.,
inflation rate). The rate of return may be higher or lower than the discount rate. As an
expectation value, in the long run both rates are expected to be equal, although in fact in
many cases the fund manager is able to generate future profits from the pension fund.
Therefore, the expected value of return on investment from the fully funded mandatory
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system is assumed to be zero, and there is no redistribution in the system because the
taxes paid are returned to the same individual in term of the future benefits.
In order to cover the weaknesses of fully funded mandatory system in terms of
assets redistribution, the distribution aspect of the pension system is attached to it from
other sources of taxes, such as consumption taxes, capital income taxes, and labor income
taxes, depending on the feasibility of each tax type. As has been shown earlier, for the
case of Indonesia indirect taxes are most feasible to be applied in the system. Such a
system is called a mixed system between defined contributions and defined benefits as
both aspects are introduced together into one package.
The redistribution that takes place in the mixed system can be considered a type
of cash transfer, without any obligation from the recipient to pay any pension taxes in
advance; that is, the benefit received is 100 percent of the transfers while the tax amount
depends on how much the individual has already paid in the consumption taxes. However,
consumption taxes are difficult to trace to an individual, and this depends on how much
individuals spend of their income in the formal goods market. It is possible that an
individual never pays the consumption taxes to the government and that he or she spends
his or her income only in the informal goods market, where the government has no access
to charge taxes. In that case, the redistribution of the benefit he or she receives could
reach 100 percent.
The distribution of cash transfers for pension necessity should be as low as
possible, only to provide the minimum physical needs, in order to motivate people to
work in the formal sector and to create their own fully funded pension account. This type
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of cash transfer should also be provided temporarily. As many people become able to
create their own pension fund, the cash transfer should be discontinued.

The Creation of Skilled Labor (The Elimination of Informal Labor Sector)

Informality impedes the government’s ability to implement fiscal policy and
reduces the government’s ability to collect from and provide transfers to individuals,
including the tax and transfer for pension policy. The only way to eliminate the informal
labor sector is to educate the new entry of working force up to the level of skilled labor,
which is up to the education level of college and university students. As people become
more educated, they would tend to refuse to enter the informal labor sector as the pay-off
and benefit in that sector is much lower compared to that in the formal sector. In this case,
I assume that the industry in the formal sector is able to absorb the amount of skilled
labor provided or the skilled labor is able to find a job in the formal sector for themselves.
The overview of current labor markets shows that the capacity of education sector
in Indonesia to provide the new skilled labor is very low; see Table 6.3 below. In year
2000, only 502 thousand people of age 20-24 in the working force received the degree of
diploma I, II, III, and bachelor. In year 2001, the amount increases a little bit to 514
thousand people, in year 2002 the amount increases further to 546 thousand people, but
decreases slightly in year 2003 to 543 thousand people. Compared to roughly 100 million
people in the working force, roughly 500 thousand people is just 0.5 percent of the total
working force.
At the same time, in year 2000 the amount of newly retired skilled labor (age 5559) who have the degree of diploma I, II, III, and bachelor is 190 thousand people; in
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year 2001, the amount is 192 thousand people, in 2002 it decreased to 178 thousand
people, and in 2003 it increased to 191 thousand people.
Given this information, the annual average of additional amount of skilled labor is
around 334 thousand people. Meanwhile, the stock of skilled labor in year 2000 is 3.24
million people, increasing to 3.30 million people in year 2001, increasing again in year
2002 to 3.34 million people, and reaching 3.40 million people in year 2003. I calculate
the average net incremental of skilled labor, and get the result equal to around 10 percent
of total skilled labor each year.
For the purpose of the elimination of a significant amount of labor in the informal
sector within a certain time, say, by 25 percent of the current amount within 20 years,
then the increment of total skilled labor by 10 percent annually is not sufficient. In year
2000, the amount of unskilled labor worked in the formal sector is 28.2 million people, or
8.2 times the amount of skilled labor worked in that sector. Still in year 2000, the amount
of unskilled labor working in the informal sector is 58.6 million people, or 16.9 times the
amount of skilled labor working in formal sector.
From year 2000 labor data, in order to eliminate 25 percent of unskilled labor in
the informal sector, the government needs to generate an additional 15 million people of
skilled labor. I assume that the job market is available for the skilled labor entering the
formal sector, or that they can create one of their own. To eliminate 50 percent of
unskilled labor in the informal sector, Indonesia needs to generate at least 29 million
people of skilled labor. To eliminate 75 percent of unskilled labor, Indonesia needs an
additional 44 million people skilled labor. To eliminate the whole informal sector means
that the Indonesian government needs at least additional 58.6 million people. I also
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Table 16. Indonesia: The Description of Labor Market Condition
According to Age and Education (in Thousand People)
>15

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

>60

Up to Primary School

1999

43345

3510

5473

6068

5645

5536

4831

3903

2913

2027

3439

Junior High School

15485

1254

1955

2168

2017

1978

1726

1394

1041

724

1229

Senior High School

32887

2663

4152

4604

4283

4200

3666

2961

2210

1538

2609

Diploma: 1 & 2 year

127

10

16

18

16

16

14

11

9

6

10

Diploma: 3 Year

1298

105

164

182

169

166

145

117

87

61

103

Bachelor

2510

203

317

351

327

321

280

226

169

117

199

>15

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

>60

Up to Primary School

44777

3688

5529

6198

5865

5940

5004

4063

3042

2096

3351

Junior High School

15997

1318

1975

2214

2095

2122

1788

1452

1087

749

1197

Senior High School

33974

2798

4195

4703

4450

4507

3797

3083

2308

1591

2542

Diploma: 1 & 2 year

131

11

16

18

17

17

15

12

9

6

10

Diploma: 3 Year

1341

110

166

186

176

178

150

122

91

63

100

Bachelor

2593

214

320

359

340

344

290

235

176

121

194

2000

>15

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

>60

Up to Primary School

2001

45669

3720

5659

6038

5971

5913

5293

4262

3289

2116

3408

Junior High School

16315

1329

2022

2157

2133

2112

1891

1523

1175

756

1217

Senior High School

34650

2822

4294

4582

4530

4486

4016

3234

2496

1605

2585

Diploma: 1 & 2 year

133

11

17

18

17

17

15

12

10

6

10

Diploma: 3 Year

1368

111

169

181

179

177

159

128

99

63

102

Bachelor

2645

215

328

350

346

342

306

247

190

123

197
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Table 16 (continued)
>15

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

>60

Up to Primary School

2002

45459

3273

6010

6138

6148

5783

5186

4123

3303

1959

3537

Junior High School

16240

1169

2147

2193

2197

2066

1853

1473

1180

700

1264

Senior High School

34491

2483

4560

4657

4665

4387

3934

3128

2506

1487

2684

Diploma: 1 & 2 year

133

10

18

18

18

17

15

12

10

6

10

Diploma: 3 Year

1361

98

180

184

184

173

155

123

99

59

106

Bachelor

2632

190

348

355

356

335

300

239

191

113

205

>15

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

>60

Up to Primary School

47116

3643

5981

6083

6174

5992

5404

4391

3552

2106

3790

Junior High School

16832

1301

2137

2173

2205

2141

1931

1569

1269

752

1354

Senior High School

35748

2764

4538

4616

4684

4546

4100

3332

2695

1598

2876

Diploma: 1 & 2 year

138

11

17

18

18

17

16

13

10

6

11

Diploma: 3 Year

1411

109

179

182

185

179

162

132

106

63

114

Bachelor

2728

211

346

352

357

347

313

254

206

122

219

2003

Source: Widjaja’s calculation, from Indonesian Central Board of Statistics Raw Data.
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assume in these calculations that the formal labor sector is able to employ the rest of the
28 million people of unskilled labor, as the sector will still need to employ that amount.
Next, I analyze the impact of creating skilled labor on the government budget.

The Budget Impact of Skilled Labor Creation

The skilled labor creation will have an impact on government expenditures. On
one hand, it will increase government expenditures for education. On the other hand, it
will reduce the government expenditure for the redistribution of pension expenditures. I
examine each issue.

The Education Budget. Given the price level and income level of year 2000, there are

3.3 million college and university students. For the government expenditures on
education (Table 17) in year 2000, Rp. 6.4 trillion is spent to support 3.3 million college
and university students. In year 2001, Rp. 4.4 trillion is expensed to support 2.9 million
college and university students. In year 2002, Rp. 4.6 trillion is spent to support 3.4
million college and university students.
By using the elasticity of government expenditure on skilled labor creation
estimated in Table 12, I estimate the additional amount of government budget for
education of skilled labor. From Table 16 and Table 17, in year 2000 the government
created 502 thousand skilled labors from 3.3 million college and university students, or
13.2 percent of skilled labor from the stock amount of college students. In year 2001, it
created 514 thousand skilled laborers out of 2.9 million college and university students,
or 17.7 percent of skilled labor. In year 2002, 546 thousand skilled labors were created
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out of 3.4 million college and university students, or 16.1 percent. Finally, in year 2003,
543 thousand skilled labors were created out of 3.5 million college and university
students, or 15.3 percent.
The average of skilled labor production over those 4 years is 15.6 percent
annually. Therefore, in order to eliminate 25 percent of unskilled labor in the informal
labor market, or to create around 15 million skilled laborers, Indonesia must educate
around 96.2 million students at the college and university level.
Supposing that the creation of skilled labor occurs within 20 years of time, then
the amount of college and university student must increase by 4.8 million people annually,
or almost 1.5 times of the 2000-2003 average level or 3.3 million students. With an
elasticity of government expenditure per skilled labor creation equal to 0.296, or roughly
0.3, then the government expenditure for the skilled labor creation should be increased
by five times of the current average annual government education expenditure amount
(Rp. 5.2 trillion), or an increase to a minimum Rp. 26 trillion annually.
By using the same argument, eliminating 50 percent of skilled labor within 20
years needs an increase of ten times government education expenditure to Rp. 52 trillion
annually, eliminating 75 percent of skilled labor within 20 years needs an increase of
fifteen times government education expenditure to Rp. 78 trillion annually, and
eliminating 100 percent of skilled labor within 20 years needs an increase of forty times
government education expenditure to Rp. 104 trillion annually. These calculations
assume that the elasticity of GDP per capita towards skilled labor education does not
change over time.
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Still from Table 16, it can be seen that that the amount of government budget in
year 2000 is Rp. 279.4 trillion, rising to Rp. 341.5 trillion in year 2001, to Rp. 345.6
trillion in year 2002, and to Rp. 370.6 trillion in year 2003. The annual average of
government expenditure for the four years is Rp. 334.3 trillion. If the central government
commits to set the increase of 25 percent skilled labor within 20 years, the education
expenditures must be around Rp. 26 trillion out of Rp. 334.3 trillion, or a minimum 7.8
percent of the annual government budget. Therefore, the increase of 50 percent skilled
labor within 20 years requires roughly 8 percent of the annual government budget. I
assume that this increase is feasible.

Table 17. Indonesia: The Central Government Education Expenditure
College and
Government
Government
Share of Government
University
Education
Total
Education Expenditure to
Student
Expenditure
Expenditure
Total Expenditure
Year
(million people)
(trillion Rp).
(trillion Rp).
(percent)
1999
3.12
6.0
231.9
2.61
2000
3.33
6.4
279.4
2.91
2001
2.91
4.4
341.5
1.30
2002
3.40
4.6
345.6
1.32
2003
3.55
5.4
370.6
1.45
2004
3.70
19.2
430.0
4.46
Source: a. "Republic of Indonesia Financial Note and Central Government Budget " (various)
b. "The population of Indonesia" (various)

The Pension Budget. There is also an impact from the elimination of informal labor on

the government cash transfers for retirees. The government will be able to cut its pension
cash transfers to the working population who are able to pay for their own fully-funded
future pension, which means that the elimination of labor who work in the informal
sector through education will eradicate the pension burden on government budget as well.
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Suppose that the government is able to eliminate 25 percent of year 2000
unskilled labor in the future, an amount of 15 million people who will retire in the year
2040. Supposed also that the government sets the cash transfer at 100 percent of the year
2040 poverty line. Then the amount that can be saved in the government budget from not
paying the transfer to 15 million people is around Rp.100 billion annually (calculated
from Table 6). Compare this to the increase of education expenditure for the same
amount of skilled labor creation (or Rp. 26 trillion annually), the amount to be saved
from pension expenditure is relatively small. However, one should also take into account
the contribution of skilled labor to the GDP as they start entering the working force and
start paying taxes revenue from their increased labor income.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Analysis of the Calibration Results

The purposes of calibration in this chapter are first to look at the distribution of
excess burden of welfare across generations before and after the consumption tax for cash
transfers is imposed, and second to look at the amount (and the distribution across sectors)
of labor in the economy before and after the tax. In doing so, I assume that workers are
able to choose their optimal working hours due to changes in consumption tax. The
assumption affects the behavioral parameter consumption share. The consumption share
is the parameter that sets the amount of working hour spent by labor. 10 The model
calibrated only skilled and unskilled labor in the formal production sector because data
for production and labor are not available in the informal production sector.

The Distribution of Tax Burden across Generations

The distribution of excess burden here is calculated by using the Hicksian
Equivalent Variation (EV). The EV means the minimum amount of monetary value
needed to compensate the individual for different prices. The calibration is made for
taxation under USD 1, USD 2, and USD 3 cash transfers. The calculation of Equivalent
Variation assumes that an additional consumption tax is compensated by reducing the
same amount of either capital income tax or labor income tax. Examples and formula of
EV calculation can be found in Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) and
Creedy (2003).

10

Consumption expenditure equals wages multiplied by working hours. Aggregate consumption then
equals the sum of labor amount multiplied by wages multiplied by working hours.
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It is useful to make clear the relative magnitudes of the consumption tax and the
cash transfers. For USD 1 cash transfer per day per person, the amount of additional
consumption taxes collected is Rp. 58.3 billion for the year 2000. The amount becomes
Rp. 116.6 billion for the USD 2 cash transfer and Rp. 174.9 billion for the USD 3 cash
transfer. The year 2000 consumption expenditures are Rp. 937.5 billion, while the
existing consumption taxes are Rp. 69.9 billion or 7.5 percent of the year 2000
consumption expenditures. If the central government charge taxes of Rp. 58.3 billion
from the consumption expenditures, then the consumption taxes collected become Rp.
128.2 billion while the tax base becomes Rp. 879.2 billion. The tax effort becomes 14.6
percent (128.2 divided by 879.2), or almost twice as high as the initial consumption tax
rate. For additional consumption taxes of Rp. 116.6 billion, the consumption taxes
collected become Rp. 186.5 billion, while the tax base becomes Rp. 820.9 billion. The tax
effort becomes 22.7 percent (186.5 divided by 820.9) after the additional consumption
tax for USD 2 cash transfer. Finally, for additional consumption taxes Rp. 174.9 billion,
the total consumption taxes amount equals Rp. 244.8 billion, while the tax base becomes
Rp. 692.7 billion. The tax rate after a consumption tax for the USD 3 cash transfer is 35.3
percent (244.8 divided by 692.7).
Assuming that the additional consumption tax is financed by labor income, the
additional consumption tax can be seen as another way to tax labor income. The year
2000 disposable labor income is Rp. 630.9 billion, with the initial tax amount Rp. 11.3
billion. The initial tax rate is 1.8 percent (11.3 divided by 630.9). Adding Rp. 58.3 billion,
the labor tax amount increases to Rp. 69.6 billion, while the labor income reduces to Rp.
572.6. The labor income tax rate reaches 12.2 percent (69.6 divided by 572.6). By doing
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the same calculation procedure, I get the labor income tax rate 24.9 percent and 40.8
percent after the additional consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer and the USD 3
cash transfer, respectively.
I assume in the calibration that labor is able to optimize their working hours after
government sets additional consumption taxes. For notation examples of the generations,
“-40” indicates the generation born 40 years before the policy takes place in year 0;
generation “0” is the generation born in year 0; generation “40” is the generation born 40
years after the policy takes place in year 0. Terminal generations are the last generations
in the sequence, generations “80” to “120”. These generations are of particular
importance because the EV values converged at these generations. 11

USD 1 cash transfer. Under consumption tax for USD 1 cash transfer (Appendix B,

Table B.1), the consumption tax rate increases to 14.6 percent. The skilled labor’s EV is
the same for both taxations under capital income and labor income compensations. The
value of EV ranges from the smallest 0.00 percent at generation “-30” to the highest 0.32
percent at terminal generations. The total welfare gain for the whole generation of skilled
labor is Rp. 69.18 billion at year 2000 prices. Still under consumption tax for USD 1
cash transfer, unskilled labor’s EV is also the same for both taxation under capital income
or labor income compensation. EV ranges from the smallest -0.01 percent at terminal
generations to the highest 1.43 percent at the “5” and “10” generations. The total welfare
loss for the whole generation of unskilled labor is Rp. 1.18 billion at year 2000 prices.

11

Convergence is made to adjust the changes of the utility function to the changes of domestic interest rate
towards the world interest rate due to the small open economy feature. For more information, see
Rasmussen and Rutherford (2004).
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Several things should be noted from these EV calculations for the consumption
tax of USD 1 cash transfer. The EV under capital income compensation or labor income
compensation is the same for both skilled and unskilled labor, which means that if labors
are elastic towards their working hours, then welfare effect of consumption tax is
indifferent whether financed by capital income or labor income taxes. Comparing both
EV movements, skilled labor’s EV has several peaks while unskilled labor’s EV keeps
going up to single peak (Appendix C, Figure C.1). In addition, the EV for unskilled labor
is higher for both capital income and labor income compensation because the amount of
unskilled labor is much higher than that of skilled labor. Meanwhile, the total welfare is
negative for unskilled labor generations but positive for skilled labor generations, which
means that under this consumption tax the skilled labor gets more of the benefits than
does the unskilled labor. Finally, the current generation the unskilled labor gets more of
the welfare benefit than the young as their EV is higher than the young’s EV.

USD 2 cash transfer. Charging a consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer (Appendix

B, Table B.2) increases the consumption tax rate to 22.7 percent of total consumption. As
before, the skilled labor’s EV is the same for both taxation under capital income or labor
income compensation. The lowest EV, -0.90 percent, takes place at generation “-40”,
while the highest EV is 0.48 percent at generation “-20” and generation “65”. The EV
converges to 0.10 percent at terminal generations. The total welfare gain for the whole
generation of skilled labor is Rp. 22.51 billion at year 2000 prices. Unskilled labor’s EV
is also the same for both taxation under capital income or labor income compensation.
The lowest EV, -0.17 percent, takes place at terminal generations while the highest EV,
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1.40 percent, takes place at generation “10”. The total welfare gain for the whole
generation of unskilled labor is negative Rp. 32.22 billion at year 2000 prices.
Note that the EV under capital income compensation or labor income
compensation is the same for both skilled and unskilled labor. The movement of skilled
labor’s EV has more peaks compared to that of unskilled labor (Appendix C, Figure C.2).
In addition, as happened under the EV calculation of the consumption taxes for the USD
1 cash transfer, the EV for unskilled labor is higher for both capital income and labor
income compensation. Meanwhile, skilled labor generations get more benefits than their
unskilled counterparts, as indicated by the total welfare gain. Finally, the current
generation the unskilled labor gets more of the welfare benefit than the young as their EV
is higher than the young’s EV.

USD 3 cash transfer. The tax rate for the consumption tax for the USD 3 cash transfer is

very high, reaching 35.2 percent. As previously happened, skilled labor’s EV for taxation
under capital income compensation is the same as under labor income (Appendix B,
Table B.3). The lowest EV, -0.03 percent, takes place at generation “-25” while the
highest, 0.64 percent, takes place at generations “70” and “75”. The EV converges to
0.08 percent at terminal generations. The total welfare gain for the whole generation of
skilled labor under capital income compensation is Rp. 17.94 billion at year 2000 prices.
Unskilled labor’s EV for taxation under capital income compensation is also the same as
the one under labor income compensation. The lowest EV, -0.52 percent, takes place at
terminal generations, while the highest EV, 1.40 percent, takes place at generation “5”.
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The total welfare loss for the whole generation of unskilled labor is Rp. 98.50 billion at
year 2000 prices.
Note finally that the EV under capital income compensation is the same as the one
under labor income compensation for both skilled and unskilled labor. Comparing the
EV movement of the skilled labor and the unskilled labor, the one under skilled labor has
several peaks, while the one under unskilled labor has only a single peak (Appendix C,
Figure C.3). The EV for unskilled labor is higher under both capital income and labor
income compensation, as the absolute amount of unskilled labor is higher than that of
skilled labor. Skilled labor gets more of the benefit than unskilled labor as the absolute
welfare gain is positive for skilled labor but negative for unskilled labor. Again, the
current generation the unskilled labor gets more of the welfare benefit than the young as
their EV is higher than the young’s EV.

The Labor Amount after Taxation

The typical assumption in the labor amount analysis is similar to the one in EV
analysis: labor is able to optimize their working hours after taxation. The labor analyzed
here are again the skilled labor and unskilled labor in the formal production sector only
because the profile of unskilled labor in the informal production sector is not available.
The calibration here is first done under consumption taxes for USD 1, USD 2, and USD 3
cash transfers, in order to compare the results here with the earlier results.. I then do
calibration under a fully funded savings pension program to observe which pension plan
generates the maximum amount of labor in the formal production sector.
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I start the analysis by setting the amount of labor at time 0 (the time when the
policy starts) equal to 1.00 before the additional consumption tax for both skilled and
unskilled labor is imposed. The 1.00 index represents 100 percent of the amount of labor
at the initial condition. Due to the feature of CGE model, the growth of skilled and
unskilled labor follows the growth of population in the model, constant at one percent
annually or five percent for every time interval. This population growth holds before and
after the additional consumption tax so that the initial ratio of skilled to unskilled labor
also equals 1.00 for every time interval. This CGE feature simplifies the analysis because
any changes of the first data in the observed series already represent changes of the rest.
Notice that the initial consumption tax rate is 7.5 percent and the labor income tax rate is
1.8 percent.

USD 1 cash transfer. After the additional consumption tax for the USD 1 cash transfer,

the consumption tax rate becomes 14.6 percent. Assuming that the consumption
expenditure is financed by labor income, the additional consumption tax rate at 7.1
percent is equivalent to an additional labor income tax rate of 10.4 percent. The new
labor income tax rate is 12.2 percent. At time 0, the index of skilled labor increases to
1.14, an increase of 14 percent from the base index, and the index of unskilled labor also
increases to 1.15, an increase of 15 percent from the base index. This means that a
consumption tax of USD 1 provides an incentive for labor, both skilled and unskilled, to
enter the formal production sector. Additional consumption tax increases the purchasing
price of the goods produced in the formal sector, and, in order to maintain utility, skilled
and unskilled labor need higher wages that are available only in the formal production
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sector. Notice that after taxation the index of unskilled labor increases slightly more than
that of the skilled labor. The additional consumption tax for the USD 1 cash transfer
slightly decreases the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor.

USD 2 cash transfer. An additional consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer

generates a different impact on the labor amount in the formal production sector. The
consumption tax rate becomes 22.7 percent, and its equivalent labor income tax rate
becomes 24.9 percent. After the additional consumption tax, at time 0, the index of
skilled labor still decreases to 0.82, 18 percent less than the initial index, and the index of
unskilled labor also decreases to 0.85, a 15 percent decrease from the initial index. Notice
that after taxation, it is the skilled labor that leaves the formal production sector the most.

USD 3 cash transfer. An additional consumption tax for USD 3 cash transfer also

provides incentives for labor to leave the formal production sector. The consumption tax
rate reaches 35.2 percent and its equivalent labor income tax rate reaches 40.8 percent. At
time 0, the index of skilled labor amount goes down to 0.78, and the index of unskilled
labor amount goes down as well into 0.75. Compared to the decreasing rate of the
consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer, the decreasing rate of skilled labor is 22
percent, but unskilled labor increases into 25 percent. Clearly, a consumption tax rate that
is too high prompts unskilled labor to leaves the formal sector the most. As a result, the
ratio of skilled labor to unskilled index increases.
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Summary. Which policy is optimal? If the goal of this policy is to provide incentives for

labor to enter the formal production sector, then the calibration result predicts that a
consumption tax that finances the USD 1 cash transfer provides the highest incentives for
labor to work in the formal sector. Its amount of skilled labor and unskilled labor is the
highest among the three policies, and also higher than the initial labor amount. An
additional consumption tax for the USD 2 cash transfer provides incentives for both types
of labor to leave the formal production sector so that it is not a good policy choice. The
consumption tax for the USD 3 cash transfer is also not a good choice since it provides
incentives for both skilled and unskilled labors to leave the formal production sector, with
unskilled labors leaving the most.

The Mandatory Fully Funded Pension Policy

Even though it is a mandatory pension program, a fully funded pension is a type
of savings program, different from a pay-as-you-go pension system. It changes the
relative price of consumption today and consumption in the retirement. However,
because it is a “forced” savings plan and here involves taxation of labor income, the setup is assumed to be based on the principle of the highest amount of labor in the formal
production sector, for both skilled and unskilled labors type.
This mandatory fully funded pension set-up comes after the consumption tax is
determined because only labor that has a relatively high income (e.g., a minimum average
Rp. 60 million annually, using the standard of average skilled labor in Indonesia) can
participate in the fully funded pension fund. At the beginning of the program, not all
labor is able to participate in the fully funded pension program. Most of the labor that is
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able to participate at the beginning is skilled labor, whose labor income is relatively high.
Later on as the program develops, it is expected that other labor will be included in each
group. The fully funded pension program will gradually replace the cash transfer pension.
Sometime in the future, as each labor has sufficient individual pension savings, the cash
transfer program is expected to be terminated. Therefore, the set-up of the fully funded
pension savings follows the best set-up of the consumption tax system that provides the
highest incentives for labor to work in the formal production sector.
The analysis of the fully funded pension set-up also based on assumption that
laborers are able to adjust their working hours. It is also assumed that the central
government has already chosen and run the consumption tax for the USD 1 cash transfer.
Because the fully funded pension plan links the contribution and the benefit, I analyze the
pension set up under 100 percent labor income finance (fully paid by the labor) and fiftyfifty finance (50 percent paid by the labor - 50 percent paid by the firm). The tax rate is
10 percent of skilled labor income, or Rp. 20.6 billion. As has been discussed in Chapter
Six, the 10 percent rate is based on the Law No. 11/1969.
The initial labor income tax rate after the consumption tax for the USD 1 cash
transfer is 12.2 percent, while the corporate capital income tax rate is 34.0 percent.
Additional fully funded savings tax of Rp. 20.6 billion increases the labor income tax rate
to 16.3 percent, while an additional Rp. 10.3 billion increases the labor income tax rate to
14.2 percent. Finally, an additional Rp. 10.3 billion fully funded savings tax increases the
capital income tax rate to 36.6 percent.
The result for the additional fully funded pension savings simulation is shown in
Appendix B, Table B.4. After the government charges 10 percent taxes on fully funded
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savings, the labor income tax rate becomes 16.3 percent, and the index of skilled labor
decreases to 1.02 from 1.14, a decrease of 0.12 index points or a 10.5 percent decrease of
skilled labor. Meanwhile, the index of unskilled labor decreases as well from 1.15 to 1.01,
a decrease of 0.14 index points or 12.2 percent of unskilled labor. Because the tax is
taken fully from the labor income, the reduction of the labor amount is purely the effect
of labor movement between sectors of production.
Still from Appendix B, Table B.4, the additional 50-50 funding of fully funded
pension savings taxes shows that the additional taxes reduces the index of skilled labor
from 1.14 into 0.69, a reduction of 0.45 index points or 39.5 percent of skilled labor
amount. The taxation also reduces the index of unskilled labor from 1.15 to 0.73, a
reduction of 0.42 index points or 36.5 percent of unskilled labor amount. At this time, the
labor income tax rate is 14.2 percent, and the capital income tax rate is 36.6 percent.
Because the taxes reduce both capital and labor income, the effect of labor reduction in
this case is due to the movement of firms from the formal sector to the informal sector, as
well as to the movement of labor themselves. The capital income tax rate is already quite
high in the initial equilibrium, so that firms could not bear any additional expense for
labor pension anymore.

Several Issues on Informal Production Sector

The informal production sector is a grey area of the economy of developing
countries; that is, informal production exists but its magnitude existence is unknown. It is
difficult to measure the output of that sector as production, as well as the number of
individuals or firms, is not reported to or registered by the government (Palmade and
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Anayiotos, 2005). Firms operating in the informal production sector can be divided into
two types: quasi informal sector and real informal sector. Firms in the quasi informal
sector are capable of operating in the formal production sector but for some reasons, like
tax avoidance, they stay in the informal production sector. They have some significant
amounts of capital and some significant amounts of labor. In contrast, firms in the real
informal sector have little capital and labor, and may quit business easily (Azuma and
Grossman, 2002). In the model building in Chapter Four, I assume that all firms are
homogenous, as is typical of the real informal sector. This assumption holds as the
government actually can easily observe large quasi informal sector firms, in term of both
labor and capital, and can require them move to the formal sector.
The real informal sector firms find it difficult to accumulate capital in the long run.
In addition to that, wages and productivity of labor become unobservable. Therefore, it is
relatively difficult to construct an applied production model of the real informal sector
that predicts the movement of capital and labor. However, the amount of labor in the
informal sector can be inferred from the amount of labor that works in the formal sector.
Although skilled and unskilled labors exist in the informal sector, most of the labor in the
informal sector is of typically unskilled. Only a small amount of skilled labor works in
the informal sector, i.e., only 0.5 percent of the total labor for the case of Indonesian
labor. The sum of the percentages of skilled labor in the formal sector, unskilled labor in
the formal sector, and unskilled labor in the informal sector is obviously equal to 100
percent. Therefore, if there is a decrease in the amount of total (skilled or unskilled) labor
in the formal sector, readers may infer that the amount of labor in the informal sector
increases. This is the approach taken here.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The Analysis of Economic Growth

Economic growth is affected by several aspects of the central government
behavior in setting up the pension plans that I have examined. In Chapter Eight, I analyze
the impact of creating skilled labor on economic growth, followed by an analysis of the
impact of taxing additional consumption for cash transfers on economic growth, and
concluding with an analysis of the impact of setting up the fully funded pension plan on
economic growth.

Creating Skilled Labor

From the year 2000 Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix (size 38*38), it can be
estimated that the income of skilled labor in that year is Rp. 206.9 trillion. With 3.45
million skilled laborers, the average income per skilled labor is Rp. 59.97 million, or
roughly Rp. 60 million per year. 12 In the same year, the total income of unskilled
laborers in the formal sector is 190.5 trillion, and the amount of unskilled labor in the
formal sector is 28.21 million people, so that the average income of unskilled labor in the
formal sector in year 2000 is Rp. 6.7 million per year.
Now suppose that the government is able to increase skilled workers by 0.75
million people annually, according to the target scenario I have discussed earlier. Assume
also that the job market is able to absorb these amounts of labor. The implication is that
this policy will increase the total income of labor by 0.75 million times Rp. 53.3 million
(the difference between skilled labor and unskilled labor income), equal to roughly Rp.
12

This amount equals to USD 6000 per year with the exchange rate Rp. 10.000 per USD.
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40 trillion per year. In terms of GDP, this increase is roughly equal to 3.2 percent of year
2000 Indonesian GDP. (Indonesian year 2000 GDP equals Rp. 1,264.9 trillion.)
Comparing the increase of the value added of labor (Rp. 40 trillion) to the
government expenditure needed to create this amount of skilled labor (Rp. 26 trillion), I
evaluate that the contribution of the skilled labor income to the economy outweighs the
government expenditure. In turn, the increase of labor income will increase consumption
expenditure. Since the average consumption expenditure in Indonesia is 60 percent to 70
percent of GDP, I assume that the increase in labor income would also increase the
consumption expenditure around 60 percent times Rp. 40 trillion, or Rp. 24 trillion. An
increase of Rp. 24 trillion in consumption expenditure equals an increase of 2.5 percent
of year 2000 consumption expenditure (Rp. 937.5 trillion). Assume also that the central
government charges a 7 percent consumption tax on the increase of consumption, where
the 7 percent rate is the year 2000 tax effort on consumption expenditure. The additional
government revenue from an increase in consumption taxes is Rp. 1.7 trillion, or an
increase of 0.85 percent of year 2000 of the central government tax revenue (Rp.195.5
trillion).

Providing Cash Transfers

However, the government effort to redistribute income through the increase in the
consumption tax would probably have a negative impact on economic growth. Suppose
that the central government is able to collect the Rp 58.3 trillion for the USD 1 per day
cash transfer and redistribute them to the retired population. This amount equals 6.2
percent of year 2000 consumption expenditure. For the retired population, the amount is
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considered as an income. Therefore, there is a possibility that they would not expend all
the cash transfer into consumption. Following the average consumption expenditure of
income, suppose that they expend only 60 percent of the cash transfers so that they
reduce the consumption amount by 40 percent of Rp. 58.3 trillion or Rp. 23.3 trillion. The
transfers would probably reduce the year 2000 Indonesian GDP by 1.8 percent. However,
because the amount of transfer is relatively a small portion of individuals’ monthly
expenditures (or only Rp. 300 thousand per month), it would probably be spent fully for
individual consumption. In the latter case, the transfer would not cause a negative impact
on economic growth because all the transfers are turn back into consumption.

Establishing a Fully Funded Savings System

Finally, in the case of a fully funded savings system, in the short run this reduces
current consumption and increases savings. Also because there is only little information
regarding how savings are turned into investment in Indonesia, I predict that the increase
in savings will reduce economic growth in the short run. If the fully funded pension
program takes 10 percent of skilled labor income into savings, or around Rp. 20.7 trillion,
it would reduce the year 2000 Indonesian GDP by the same amount, or 1.6 percent.
However, within 20 to 30 years, as skilled labor retires, the savings would be turned into
cash and spent in terms of consumption again, so it is like transferring the current
consumption into future consumption. The current economic growth is reduced by the
fully funded program, but the future consumption would likely increase. In this case, I
assume that the pension fund institutions are trustable, so that they would invest the
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savings fund in a profitable manner and keep the fund intact until the time of
disbursement.
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CHAPTER NINE
Final Conclusions

As the absolute and relative amount of the retired population increases in
Indonesia, there emerges a need for Indonesia to have an integrated pension program.
Support from family members for the elderly would be discontinued eventually because
the amount of children in one family is getting smaller, the elderly live longer, and the
family is becoming more and more fragmented, as children are no longer live with their
parents after married (McKee, 2006). The pension program must fit the characteristics of
Indonesia as a developing country, where output markets and labor markets are massive
in the informal sector. As the central government has little ability to collect taxes in the
informal sector, any social security taxation in the formal sector could make firms and
labor move from a formal sector to an informal sector. Therefore, an investigation of the
type of pension reform and its financing is necessary. This is the broad purpose of this
dissertation.
Experiences from developing countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and
China have shown that a combination of defined benefits in one program and defined
contributions in another program can fit the pension system for a country with a massive
informal sector, both in the output market and in the labor market. The two programs
together serve the redistribution purpose on the one hand and the savings purpose on the
other hand. The separation of the purposes is meant to prevent the application of a
pension system causing labor and firms to move to the informal sector, as well as to
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maintain the sustainability of the program by insulating the program from the aging
problem.
Using an overlapping generation model, the analysis of sources of financing for
the Indonesian redistribution program shows that consumption tax financing fits the main
criteria as the source of redistribution financing. One implication of the additional
taxation on consumption is additional burdens on generations. As generations distribute
the tax burden among them, the analysis of equivalent variation for the tax burden
distribution shows that skilled labor generations bear fewer burdens than that of unskilled
labor under a consumption tax that finances a USD 1 cash transfer (a 14.6 percent
consumption tax rate), under a consumption tax for a USD 2 cash transfer (a 24.9 percent
consumption tax rate), and under a consumption tax for a USD 3 cash transfer (a35.3
percent consumption tax rate).
The analysis of the impact of a consumption tax on the amount of skilled and
unskilled labor shows that the consumption tax for a USD 1 cash transfer provides the
highest incentives for the skilled and unskilled labor to work in the formal sector, an
increase by 14 percent skilled labor and 15 percent unskilled labor. The consumption tax
rate is 14.6 percent, and its equivalent labor income tax rate is 12.2 percent. The
consumption tax for a USD 2 cash transfer would decrease by 18 percent skilled labor
and by 15 percent of unskilled labor in the formal sector, while the consumption tax for a
USD 3 cash transfer would decrease skilled labor by 22 percent and unskilled labor by 25
percent. In addition, the set up of a fully-funded pension after the consumption tax for the
USD 1 cash transfer shows 100 percent labor income financing is the one that provides
the highest incentives for skilled and unskilled labor to work in the formal sector. In
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contrast, an alternative financing split of 50 percent labor income tax and 50 percent
capital income financing would stimulate the firms and both skilled and unskilled labor to
leave the formal sector. The initial tax rate of capital income has already been too high,
so that any additional tax rate for pensions would move the firms to the informal sector.
For the fully funded pension system to work in a long run, say, over 50 years,
there is a requirement that the size of formal labor sector is wide enough and the amount
of skilled labor supporting it is vast enough. There is no standard benchmark, but here I
set 25 percent of total labor as skilled labor for the minimum requirement. The effort to
reach 25 percent of total labor within 20 years (or 1.25 percent annually) will require 8
percent of annual government budgets be devoted to education. By using the average of
year 2000-2003 government budget, this amount equals Rp. 26 billion per year.
For the analysis of economic growth, skilled labor creation to eliminate 25
percent of labor in the informal sector would increase labor value added by Rp. 39 billion,
or 3.1 percent of year 2000 GDP. In the future (year 2040), if the government plans to
reduce cash transfers to individuals, the amount that can be saved in the government
budget from not paying the transfer is Rp. 100 billion per year, assuming that the transfer
is at 100 percent of poverty line. However, the increase of the consumption tax rate for
redistribution would probably reduce the economic growth by the average savings rate
multiplied by the consumption tax rate. The smaller the savings rate, the lower is
economic growth, as the additional consumption tax rate has been targeted. In addition,
the application of a fully funded savings pension plan would also reduce the current
economic growth but would likely increase the future one when the pensioners disburse
their savings from the pension plan.
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Finally, there are two propositions that I can contribute to the theory of public
finance. First, in an economy with a large informal production and labor sector,
consumption taxes are preferable to income taxation because my results indicate that
consumption taxes are more likely to induce the movement of labor to the formal sector.
In addition, the consumption tax must be paid in some way by every household whether
they produce in the formal sector or informal sector. Second, given formal and informal
labor markets in an economy, where the informal labor market is dominant; there exists
an optimal consumption tax rate that provides an incentive to the highest amount of labor
to work in the formal sector. It is time and the application of taxation that will prove the
accuracy of these two propositions.
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Appendix A
Examples of Country with Formal - Informal Labor Economy
Running Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension System
Countries

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

China

Funding

Multi-pillar system
Pillar 1 : Flat Benefit
Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts
many private funds
Two main regimes :
Private Sector Workers (RGPS)
pay-as-you-go basis

Contribution
Percent of Employees Earning

Benefits

6 percent -16 percent paid by employee
11 percent paid by employee

Flat - 30 percent of male average wage
annuity
minimum benefit $140 after 10 years' service

8 percent paid by the employer
some amount by employees up to
a ceiling, min 30 years contribution

minimum wage or
average of last 3 year wage

Civil Servant (RPPS)

11 percent paid by the employees

Multi-pillar system
Pillar 1 : Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG)
Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts
many private funds

Financed from Gov general revenues
13 percent paid by employee

MPG (27 percent of male average wage)
annuity

Financed from employer’s account by
17 percent of employee’s wage,
min 15 years of working time

20 percent of average wage

Multi-pillar system
Pillar 1 : Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG)

Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts

employer contribution : 3 percent of wage
employee contribution : 8 percent of wage
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Appendix A (continued)
Countries
Mexico

Funding
Multi-pillar system
Pillar 1 : Social Quota (SQ) +
Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG)
Pillar 2 : Funded Individual Accounts
Many private funds

Contribution
Percent of Employees Earning

Benefits

5.5% of minimum wage paid by Gov

annuity

6.5% paid by employee

annuity
1 minimum wage after 25 years' contribution

Source : Dunaway and Arora (2007), Filho (2005), James et al. (2003)
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Appendix B
The Calibration Results
Table B.1
The Percent Change of the Equivalent Variation
Of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Formal Sector
Of Additional Consumption Tax
USD 1 Cash Transfer

Generation
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
-0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120

Skilled Labor
Capital
Labor
Income
Income
Compensated
Compensated
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.07
0.11
0.11
0.25
0.25
0.05
0.05
0.16
0.16
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.15
0.17
0.17
0.19
0.19
0.21
0.21
0.24
0.24
0.27
0.27
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32

69.18
Welfare Gain
2000 Rp Billion
Source : Widjaja, calibration result.

69.18

Unskilled Labor
Capital
Labor
Income
Income
Compensated Compensated
0.93
0.93
1.08
1.08
1.03
1.03
1.16
1.16
1.23
1.23
1.30
1.30
1.39
1.39
1.38
1.38
1.35
1.35
1.43
1.43
1.43
1.43
1.42
1.42
1.40
1.40
1.36
1.36
1.31
1.31
1.25
1.25
1.18
1.18
1.08
1.08
0.97
0.97
0.83
0.83
0.68
0.68
0.52
0.52
0.34
0.34
0.17
0.17
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-1.18

-1.18
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Table B.2
The Percent Change of the Equivalent Variation
Of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Formal Sector
Of Additional Consumption Tax
USD 2 Cash Transfer

Generation
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120

Skilled Labor
Labor
Capital Income
Income
Compensated
Compensated
-0.90
-0.90
0.75
0.75
-0.12
-0.12
-0.04
-0.04
0.48
0.48
0.38
0.38
0.10
0.10
-0.29
-0.29
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.12
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.18
0.18
0.23
0.23
0.29
0.29
0.37
0.37
0.48
0.48
-0.10
-0.10
-0.01
-0.01
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10

22.51
Welfare Gain
2000 Rp Billion
Source : Widjaja, calibration result.

22.51

Unskilled Labor
Labor
Capital Income Income
Compensated
Compensated
0.86
0.86
1.04
1.04
1.00
1.00
1.13
1.13
1.18
1.18
1.25
1.25
1.33
1.33
1.31
1.31
1.29
1.29
1.38
1.38
1.40
1.40
1.39
1.39
1.38
1.38
1.35
1.35
1.30
1.30
1.23
1.23
1.13
1.13
1.02
1.02
0.89
0.89
0.74
0.74
0.56
0.56
0.44
0.44
0.23
0.23
0.55
0.55
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-32.22

-32.22
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Table B.3
The Percent Change of the Equivalent Variation
Of Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Formal Sector
Of Additional Consumption Tax
USD 3 Cash Transfer

Generation
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120

Skilled Labor
Capital
Labor
Income
Income
Compensated Compensated
0.35
0.35
0.17
0.17
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
0.24
0.24
0.21
0.21
0.10
0.10
0.15
0.15
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.15
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.25
0.25
0.33
0.33
0.38
0.38
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08

17.94
Welfare Gain
2000 Rp Billion
Source : Widjaja, calibration result.

17.94

Unskilled Labor
Capital
Labor
Income
Income
Compensated Compensated
0.91
0.91
1.07
1.07
1.03
1.03
1.15
1.15
1.23
1.23
1.29
1.29
1.37
1.37
1.35
1.35
1.32
1.32
1.40
1.40
1.37
1.37
1.33
1.33
1.28
1.28
1.20
1.20
1.11
1.11
0.99
0.99
0.83
0.83
0.65
0.65
0.45
0.45
0.22
0.22
0.20
0.20
-0.27
-0.27
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-0.52
-98.50

-98.50
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Table B.4
The Amount of Labor (percent)
After Additional Consumption Tax and Fully Funded Pension Tax
Before
Consumption Tax
After Consumption Tax
USD 1 per day
USD 2 per day
person
person
Transfer
Transfer

USD 3 per day
person
Transfer

Fully Funded Pension Savings After USD 1
Consumption Tax
5 percent Labor Income
10 percent Labor
and
Income
5 percent Capital Income

Year

LS(T)

LU(T)

LS(T)

LU(T)

LS(T)

LU(T)

LS(T)

LU(T)

LS(T)

LU(T)

LS(T)

LU(T)

0

1.00

1.00

1.14

1.15

0.82

0.85

0.78

0.75

1.02

1.01

0.69

0.73

5

1.05

1.05

1.20

1.21

0.86

0.89

0.82

0.78

1.07

1.07

0.73

0.77

10

1.10

1.10

1.26

1.27

0.91

0.94

0.87

0.82

1.12

1.12

0.77

0.81

15

1.16

1.16

1.32

1.33

0.95

0.98

0.91

0.87

1.18

1.18

0.81

0.85

20

1.22

1.22

1.39

1.40

1.00

1.03

0.96

0.91

1.24

1.24

0.85

0.89

25

1.28

1.28

1.46

1.47

1.05

1.09

1.00

0.96

1.31

1.30

0.89

0.94

30

1.35

1.35

1.54

1.55

1.11

1.14

1.06

1.01

1.37

1.37

0.93

0.99

35

1.42

1.42

1.62

1.63

1.16

1.20

1.11

1.06

1.44

1.44

0.98

1.04

40

1.49

1.49

1.70

1.71

1.22

1.26

1.17

1.11

1.52

1.51

1.03

1.09

45

1.56

1.56

1.78

1.80

1.28

1.33

1.23

1.17

1.59

1.59

1.09

1.15

50

1.64

1.64

1.88

1.89

1.35

1.39

1.29

1.23

1.67

1.67

1.14

1.20

55

1.73

1.73

1.97

1.99

1.42

1.46

1.35

1.29

1.76

1.75

1.20

1.27

60

1.82

1.82

2.07

2.09

1.49

1.54

1.42

1.35

1.85

1.84

1.26

1.33

65

1.91

1.91

2.18

2.15

1.57

1.62

1.50

1.42

1.94

1.94

1.32

1.40

70

2.01

2.01

2.29

2.31

1.65

1.70

1.57

1.50

2.04

2.04

1.39

1.47

75

2.11

2.11

2.41

2.42

1.73

1.79

1.65

1.57

2.15

2.14

1.46

1.54

80

2.22

2.22

2.53

2.55

1.82

1.88

1.74

1.65

2.26

2.25

1.54

1.62

85

2.33

2.33

2.66

2.68

1.91

1.97

1.83

1.74

2.37

2.36

1.62

1.71

90

2.45

2.45

2.79

2.81

2.01

2.08

1.92

1.83

2.49

2.48

1.70

1.79

95

2.57

2.57

2.93

2.96

2.11

2.18

2.02

1.92

2.62

2.61

1.78

1.88

100

2.70

2.70

3.08

3.11

2.22

2.29

2.12

2.02

2.75

2.74

1.88

1.98

105

2.84

2.84

3.24

3.27

2.33

2.41

2.23

2.12

2.89

2.88

1.97

2.08

110

2.99

2.99

3.41

3.43

2.45

2.53

2.34

2.23

3.04

3.03

2.07

2.19

115

3.14

3.14

3.58

3.61

2.58

2.66

2.46

2.34

3.20

3.18

2.18

2.30

120

3.30

3.30

3.76

3.79

2.71

2.80

2.59

2.46

3.36

3.35

2.29

2.42

Source: Widjaja, calibration result.
Note: LS(T) = formal sector skilled labor amount; LU(T) = formal sector unskilled labor amount
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